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Survey of Cases Decided Under Revised Article 9:
There's Not Much New Under the Sun
Margit Livingston*
I. INTRODUCTION
After the Uniform Commercial Code' was first promulgated in the
1950s2 and began to be widely adopted in 1960s,3 Article 9 governing
security interests in personal property was hailed as the outstanding
achievement of the commercial law codification process. 4 It unified
the formerly fractured legal world of personal property security de-
vices by creating a single framework for secured transactions, regard-
less of their form or the type of collateral involved. 5 Although Article
9 was not without its problem areas, it remained a testament to the
drafters' ingenuity in simplifying and clarifying the impenetrable tan-
gle of the preceding laws.
Revised Article 9 represents the first major overhaul of Article 9
since 1972. The drafters spent the better part of the 1990s studying
the flaws of former Article 9 and reworking it to "build a better
mousetrap." Among their several goals, the revisers 6 sought to ex-
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge
the exceptional research contribution made by DePaul University law student Michael J. Borree
('03). Additionally, the author thanks DePaul University law student Paige Barr for her able
research assistance for this project.
2. One scholar extolled the Uniform Commercial Code as "probably the most important piece
of business legislation ever prepared in the United States, if not in the world." Frederick K.
Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code as a Problem in Codification, 16 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 141, 141 (1951).
3. William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1967).
4. Id. at 9-11.
5. See, e.g., Donald J. Rapson, Default and Enforcement of Security Interests under Revised
Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 893 (1999) (stating that "Article 9 has been rightfully
lauded as the 'jewel' of the Uniform Commercial Code").
6. Karl Llewellyn, the Chief Reporter for the Uniform Commercial Code, once noted the
inefficiencies created by the patchwork of older commercial laws: "What is not minor is the price
in complexity, inconvenience, and often in unfairness which must be paid when legal patterns of
happenstance origin are taken in all their history-ridden detail as the basis for the doing of
remodeling jobs which are themselves piece-work." K.N. Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying Se-
curity Law, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 687, 688 (1948). See also Karl N. Llewellyn, Why We
Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 367, 379 (1957) (observing that "the
whole of Article 9 brings into simplified and workable form the law of all chattel security").
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pand Article 9 to encompass some transactions formerly excluded:
Because Article 9 had worked so well as a legal model, expanding its
scope would bring a larger number of transactions the benefits of its
elegance and workability. The revisers also wanted to address several
problematic issues that had arisen under the 1972 version of Article 9.
They sought to clarify some of the priority rules and simplify the filing
rules to make perfecting security interests more straightforward and
less costly. In addition, many of the revisions seemed geared toward
allowing secured creditors an easier time in bankruptcy-principally,
by permitting security interests to stand up more frequently against
lien creditors.
Two years after July 1, 2001, the uniform effective date for Revised
Article 9,7 the courts have had some chances to apply the new law to
both bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy cases involving security inter-
ests. Revised Article 9's transition rules state that unless an exception
applies, the new law applies "to a transaction or lien within its scope,
even if the transaction or lien was entered into or created before this
[Act] takes effect."'8 Additionally, the transition rules state that the
new law "does not affect an action, case, or proceeding commenced
before [the new law] takes effect."9
This Article summarizes the most significant cases decided under
new Article 9 and considers the impact of the new law on the courts
and the outcome of decided cases. 10 Part I of this Article describes
cases dealing with the scope of Revised Article 9. Part II examines
cases resolving attachment and perfection issues. Part III reviews
cases that consider proceeds and priorities questions, and default and
7. Article 9 is the joint product of the American Law Institute ("ALI") and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"). Steven 0. Weise, An
Overview of Revised UCC Revised Article 9, in THE NEW ARTICLE 9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 1 (Corinne Cooper ed., 2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter THE NEW ARTICLE 9]. The ALI and
NCCUSL appointed a study committee in 1990 to assess Article 9 and recommend possible
revisions. Edwin E. Smith, An Introduction to Revised Article 9 (1999), in THE NEW ARTICLE 9,
supra, at 17. In its final 1992 report, the Study Group recommended changes to Article 9 that
would increase its scope, simplify perfection, and clarify enforcement rules. PERMANENT EDITO-
RIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE STUDY GROUP, REPORT ON UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9, at 10-11 (1992).
8. U.C.C. § 9-701 (Official Text 2001). All citations to Article 9 in this article will be to Re-
vised Article 9 unless indicated otherwise. Former Article 9 (Official Text 1995) will be indi-
cated as such.
9. U.C.C. § 9-702(a) (2001).
10. Id. (c). See In re AvCentral, Inc., 289 B.R. 170, 171 n.3 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2003) (noting that
because the case before the court was filed after July 1, 2001, the effective date of Revised
Article 9 in Kansas, the new law applied); In re Wiersma, 283 B.R. 294, 299 (Bankr. D. Idaho
2002) (applying Revised Article 9 because the debtor had filed for bankruptcy after the new
law's effective date).
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foreclosure cases are the subject of Part IV. Finally, I conclude that
despite its relatively sweeping changes, new Article 9 has yet to have a
significant impact on the outcome of decided cases. This perceived
lack of impact does not mean, however, that the new law is not affect-
ing how secured transactions are being set up and enforced outside of
the litigation context.
II. SCOPE AND PREEMPTION ISSUES
One of Revised Article 9's stated goals was to bring within its fold a
greater number of secured transactions. Thus, the new law governs
agricultural liens"1 for the first time as well as sales of promissory
notes and payment intangibles, 12 security interests in deposit ac-
counts,13 and consignments.14 Given the success of former Article 9 in
simplifying and clarifying the law in this area, the revisers sought to
extend the benefits of the Article 9 scheme to certain transactions for-
merly excluded. 15 Along with the expanded scope of new Article 9,
however, the drafters retained the preemption provisions of the old
law, deferring to specific federal and state statutes governing particu-
lar types of transactions. 16 The handful of preemption cases decided
under the new law continues to recognize this deference to non-Arti-
cle 9 schemes.
11. It should be noted that not all cases decided under former Article 9 have become obsolete
with the revision's enactment. There are several recent cases decided under the old version of
Article 9 still have considerable relevance under the new law, especially with respect to provi-
sions that the revisers left untouched or ambiguous. See, e.g., Shelby County State Bank v. Van
Diest Supply Co., 303 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 2002) (limiting the supplier's security interest to
products sold to the debtor by the supplier, rather than all inventory, based on the parties' inten-
tion as inferred from "ambiguous" clause in the security agreement); In re QDS Components,
Inc., 292 B.R. 313, 345-46 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2002) (holding that lease agreements were true
leases, not disguised security agreements, because the lessor retained a "meaningful reversionary
interest" in the leased equipment).
12. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(5) (2001). "Agricultural liens" are defined as non-possessory, statutory
liens in farm products in favor of a supplier of goods or services furnished in connection with the
debtor's farming operation or in favor of a lessor of real property leased in connection with the
debtor's farming operation. Id.
13. Id. § 9-109(a)(3).
14. See id. § 9-109, cmt. 16 (noting that Revised Article 9 now includes security interests in
deposit accounts).
15. Id. § 9-109 (a)(4). Small-scale and consumer consignments are still excluded as well as
consignments to a merchant who "is ... generally known by its creditors to be substantially
engaged in selling the goods of others." Id. § 9-102 (a)(20).
16. See Weise, supra note 6, at 2.
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A. Preemption
In In re AvCentral, Inc., the secured party, Joda LLC ("Joda") took
security interests in two DC-9 aircraft owned by the debtor, AvCen-
tral, Inc. ("AvCentral"), along with the airplanes' engines and propel-
lers.17  Joda perfected its security interests by filing the parties'
security agreements with the Federal Aviation Administration, as re-
quired by federal law. 18 The debtor later filed for relief under Chap-
ter 7 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. 19
The bankruptcy trustee argued that Joda's security interests were
unperfected by virtue of Joda's failure to file an Article 9 financing
statement in the appropriate state.20 Although the debtor purchased
the aircraft intact, it then disassembled them into component parts for
resale. As such, the trustee asserted that the parts became inventory
within the scope of Article 9, and thus subject to Article 9 filing
requirements. 21
After noting that new Article 9 applied to this conflict, the court
then analyzed its preemption provisions. Like former Article 9, the
new law provides that it does not apply "to the extent that a statute,
regulation or treaty of the United States preempts it. ' ' 22 The Federal
Aviation Act, the court observed, creates a central recording system
for security interests in civil aircraft.2 3 Generally, however, the Avia-
tion Act does not cover security interests in aircraft parts, unless they
are maintained by or for an air carrier.24 Given the debtor's disassem-
bling of the aircraft into component parts held for sale, the trustee had
a plausible argument that Article 9 applied.25 The court ultimately
concluded that the federal recording scheme controlled "because the
aircraft were whole and intact at the time the security interests were
granted and the instruments recorded. '26
17. See U.C.C. § 9-109(c)(1) (2001) (excluding transactions in which federal law preempts Ar-
ticle 9); id. (c)(2), (3) (excluding transactions in which another state statute governs security
interests created by a governmental entity); U.C.C. § 9-311(a)(2), (3) (2001) (deferring to state
certificate-of-title laws for titled vehicles).
18. 289 B.R. 170, 171 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2003).
19. Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44107 (a)(1), (a)(2)).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. AvCentral, 289 B.R. at 171-72.
23. Id. at 172 (citing to Kansas' version of Revised U.C.C. §§ 9-109(c)(1), 9-311(a)).
24. Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44107(a)(1), (a)(2)(A) - (D)).
25. Id.
26. The court noted that under U.C.C. § 9-311(d) "while collateral is inventory held for sale
by a person in the business of selling goods of its kind, section 9-311 does not apply to a security
interest created by that person." Id.
[Vol. 2:47
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While the AvCentral case focused on the federal preemption of Ar-
ticle 9's filing requirements, Article 9 also contemplates that some
transactions may be excluded in their entirety because of federal pre-
emption.27 In Surgicore, Inc. v. Principal Life Insurance Co.,28 several
patients had assigned their rights to health insurance benefits to
Surgicore, a medical service provider.29 The insurer, Principal Life In-
surance ("Principal"), denied all or part of each patient's claim, and
Surgicore, as an assignee, brought suit to enforce its rights in these
receivables. 30
Moving to dismiss Surgicore's state law claims, Prinicipal asserted
that ERISA, as a federal statute, pre-empted state law in the area of
health care insurance receivables. 31 Surgicore responded that the Ar-
ticle 9 provision addressing the rights of an assignee to payment under
an insurance policy is all-encompassing with regards to the type of
insurance payment, and thus ERISA is not at issue.32 Surgicore fur-
ther argued that, as an assignee, it was not required to file a financing
statement to perfect its security interest in the right to payment.33
The court found that ERISA pre-empted state law. State laws that
"relate to" employee welfare benefit plans implicate the ERISA pre-
emption provision.34 Article 9, since it purports to govern assign-
ments of health-care-insurance receivables, including those under an
ERISA plan, had a "connection with" the ERISA plans at issue. 35
27. Id. at 173.
28. Compare Revised U.C.C. § 9 -109(c)(1) (excluding transactions to the extent that "a stat-
ute, regulation, or treaty of the United States preempts this article") with id. § 9-311(a)(1) (stat-
ing that "the filing of a financing statement is not necessary or effective to perfect a security
interest in property subject to ... a statute, regulation, or treaty of the United States .... ").
29. Surgicore, Inc. v. Principal Life Ins. Co., No. 01 C 9387, 2002 WL 1052034 (N.D. Ill. May
22, 2002).
30. Surgicore, 2002 WL 1052034, at *1-2.
31. Id. The plaintiff brought claims under both state law (Article 9) and federal law (the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, "ERISA").
32. Id. at *3.
33. Id.
34. Id. The court did not elaborate on the basis for Surgicore's claim that it need not file a
financing statement even though Article 9 arguably applied to the transaction. Under the ex-
panded definition of "account" in new Article 9, health-care-insurance receivables are consid-
ered accounts. Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2001). The patients' right to receive payment
from Principal would be a health-care-insurance receivable and thus an account. See id. (46)
(defining health-care-insurance receivable as "an interest in or claim under a policy of insurance
which is a right to payment of a monetary obligation for health-care goods or services provided
or to be provided"). Under Revised U.C.C. § 9-309(5), assignments of health-care-insurance
receivables to the health-care goods or services provider are automatically perfected upon at-
tachment. Thus, Surgicore was correct that if Article 9 governed, it did not need to file a financ-
ing statement to perfect its interest.
35. See Surgicore, 2002 WL 052034, at *4 (stating that a state law "relates to" a plan if it "(1)
has a connection with or (2) reference to such a plan").
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Because Article 9 sets out requirements for such assignments, it af-
fects the manner in which benefits are distributed under the ERISA
plan, and thus creates a potential conflict with federal law.36 As such,
the federal law must prevail, and the court dismissed Surgicore's Arti-
cle 9 claim to enforce the assignment of insurance benefits to it.37
In Crestmark Bank v. United States (In re Spearing Tool and Manu-
facturing Co.), 38 the secured party, Crestmark, attempted to contest
the validity of a previously filed federal tax lien. Before advancing
additional funds to the debtor under their security agreement, the
creditor had submitted a lien search to the State of Michigan, using
the debtor's registered name, "Spearing Tool and Manufacturing
Co."' 39 The search results indicated no liens, and Crestmark lent the
debtor additional monies. 40 Previously, the Internal Revenue Service
had filed two notices of a federal tax lien with the Michigan Secretary
of State, using the name "Spearing Tool & MFG Company, Inc. '41
After the debtor filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection,
Crestmark filed a complaint to determine priority to certain pre-peti-
tion accounts receivable collections. The secured party argued that
new Article 9 essentially allows searching parties to use only the
debtor's precise legal name in their searches. 42 If such a search does
not reveal a filing, the filing is invalid.
Although not specifically labeling the issue as one of preemption,
the court held that federal, not state, law dictated the form of the no-
tice that must be filed by the IRS asserting a tax lien against a particu-
lar taxpayer.43 Treasury regulations under the federal tax lien statute
required only that the lien notice "identify the taxpayer. ' 44 The court
found that the name used by the IRS sufficiently identified the tax-
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The court held, however, that Surgicore was properly an assignee for ERISA purposes
and therefore had standing to sue under the federal statute to enforce its rights as an assignee.
Id. at *3.
39. In re Spearing Tool and Manufacturing Co., 292 B.R. 579 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003).
40. Id. at 580.
41. ld.
42. Id.
43. Crestmark argued that under Revised Article 9, a financing statement must use the
debtor's official legal name. Id. at 582 (citing Michigan's version of Revised U.C.C. § 9-
503(1)(a)). If the financing statement sets forth the debtor's name incorrectly, then it is invalid
unless "a search of the records of the filing office ... using the filing office's standard search
logic, if any, would disclose [the] financing statement . Id. (citing Michigan's version of
Revised U.C.C. § 9-506(2), (3)).
44. Id. at 582-3.
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payer since it was close to the debtor's legal name and contained a
commonly used abbreviation for "Manufacturing. '45
This decision, though not surprising, has ramifications for secured
or would-be secured creditors attempting to ascertain the existence of
prior interests in the debtor's property. Undoubtedly, Revised Article
9 has simplified the search process for inquiring parties, but those par-
ties will still need to think creatively about the debtor's name in con-
ducting searches for federal tax liens. Anticipating common variant
spellings (e.g., "MFG" for "Manufacturing") and using truncated por-
tions of the debtor's name (e.g., "Spearing Tool") will continue to be
useful searching techniques.
In addition to acknowledging federal preemption, Revised Article
9, like the former statute, defers to state certificate-of-title laws as well
as "any non-Uniform Commercial Code central filing statute. '46 In
Farmer v. LaSalle Bank (In re Morgan), the secured party had refi-
nanced the debtor's car loan, but waited two years to apply to have its
lien noted on the vehicle's certificate of title.47 In the meantime, the
debtor filed a voluntary petition under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code.48 Using its status as a hypothetical lien creditor, the bankruptcy
trustee attempted to avoid the creditor's security interest as
unperfected. 49
The creditor argued that, as an assignee of the original secured
party, it was entitled to stand in the original secured party's shoes
through the doctrine of equitable subordination.5 0 The original se-
cured party had its security interest properly noted on the automo-
bile's certificate of title.51 Citing to U.C.C. § 1-103, the creditor
argued that the court was free to consider general equitable principles,
such as equitable subordination, in deciding Code cases. 52
The court in Morgan, however, held otherwise. Given Revised Ar-
ticle 9's specific deference to state certificate-of-title laws, the court
stated that the perfection of security interests in motor vehicles was
completely outside of the Uniform Commercial Code.53 Further, the
45. Id. at 583. (citing Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(f)-1(d)(2)).
46. Id.
47. U.C.C. § 9-311(a)(2) (2001).
48. 291 B.R. 795, 798 (E.D. Tenn. 2003).
49. See id. (noting that the debtor filed her bankruptcy petition on Mar. 27, 2001, and the
creditor applied for the notation of its lien on the automobile's certificate of title on May 10,
2001).
50. See id. at 797 (citing 11 U.S.C.A. § 544 (West 1993 & Supp. 2002)).
51. Id. at 799.
52. Id. at 798.
53. Morgan, 291 B.R. at 801.
2003]
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court stated that "[t]here is nothing in the Tennessee Certificate of Title
Statute that allows a court to supplement the Statute with equitable
principles. '5 4 In the same vein, the court held that the creditor could
not, in essence, "piggyback" on the original secured party's lien that
was still noted on the vehicle's title when the debtor filed for bank-
ruptcy.55 As such, the creditor's security interest was unperfected at
the time that the bankruptcy petition was filed, and the trustee could
avoid it.56
Although the holding in Morgan may ultimately be correct, the
court spoke perhaps too hastily when it stated that the creditor could
not "piggyback" on the original secured party's perfection. Revised
U.C.C. § 9-310 (c) expressly states that the assignee of an original per-
fected security interest need not reperfect "to continue the perfected
status of the security interest against creditors of and transferees from
the original debtor. '57 One of the Official Comments to that section
indicates that the provision applies to assignments of security interests
perfected through complying with a certificate-of-title statute, unless
"the statute expressly provides to the contrary. '58 In other words, the
creditor in Morgan was entitled to rely on the notation of the original
secured party's lien on the title as adequately perfecting its security
interest as an assignee unless the Tennessee title law specifically pro-
vided otherwise.
Because the court did not address this point, the case does not sup-
ply any information about the precise terms of the Tennessee title law
with respect to assignments. 59
B. Other Scope Cases
As mentioned previously, the revisers significantly expanded the
scope of new Article 9 to include types of transactions previously ex-
cluded. 60 Two of these types include consignments and security inter-
54. Id. at 801-02.
55. Id. at 801.
56. Id. at 803 (setting forth the creditor's argument that because the original secured party
"never released its perfected lien on the Automobile, perfection was continuous between the two
entities..."). The court emphasized that it was the second creditor's "responsibility to get the
title from [the first secured party] or to obtain a duplicate title. Id.
57. Id. at 804-05.
58. U.C.C. § 9-310(c) (2001).
59. Id. cmt. 4.
60. The Tennessee certificate-of-title statute is somewhat ambiguous about whether an as-
signee must have its security interest noted on the title to maintain its perfected status. See
TENN. CODE ANN. 55-3-124 (2003). The statute states that an assignee "shall" apply to have its
lien noted on the certificate of title. Id. (a). At the same time, it specifies that "[t]he assignee of
any lien shall be entitled to the same priority among the outstanding lienors and have all the
[Vol. 2:47
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ests in commercial tort claims. In In re Valley Media, Inc., the debtor,
before the filing of its chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in November
2001, was the largest wholesale supplier of entertainment software
products in the United States.61 In 1997, the debtor, Valley Media,
Inc., had acquired Distribution North America ("DNA") for the pur-
pose of aiding in its distribution activities. At all times, DNA was an
unincorporated subsidiary of Valley Media, and DNA had no officers
or directors of its own. 62
As a distributor for Valley Media, DNA entered into several distri-
bution agreements with vendors whereby the vendors gave DNA cer-
tain products on consignment. 63 Following the filing of its chapter 11
bankruptcy petition, Valley Media filed a motion to sell its own inven-
tory and that held by DNA on a consignment basis.64 Several of
DNA's vendors brought objections to Valley Media's motion, arguing
that as consignors, they held title to the consigned goods and could
thus reclaim them from the debtor.65
In considering whether to apply former or Revised Article 9 to the
dispute, the bankruptcy court pointed out that resolution of the dis-
pute would be the same under either version of Article 9.66 The court
observed, however, that the approach of Revised Article 9 to consign-
ments was "slightly different" from that of the old law.67 The new
statute brings all transactions that fit the statutory definition of "con-
signment" within the scope of Article 9 and makes them equivalent to
a purchase money security interest in inventory. 68 As such, consign-
ments are subject to Article 9 filing requirements. 69
To escape inclusion within Article 9 and its filing requirements, con-
signors may try to show that their transactions do not fit the statutory
definition. In Valley Media, the consignors attempted to prove that
DNA was a merchant who was "generally known by its creditors to be
other property rights therein as had formerly been held by the assignor." Id. (b). It is not clear
whether subsections (a) and (b) of that section are related: in other words, whether it is neces-
sary for the assignee to have its interest noted on the title to enjoy priority rights.
61. See supra notes 11- 14 and accompanying text.
62. 279 B.R. 105, 114 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 115 (observing that "[u]nder a consignment arrangement, the title to the inventory
remains with the vendor and the goods are not paid for until the distributor sells the products.").
65. Id. at 111-12.
66. Id. at 121.
67. Id. at 123.
68. Id. at 124 n.33.
69. See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(4) (2001) (stating that Article 9 applies to consignments); id. § 9-
109, cmt. 6 (stating that a consignor's security interest in goods is "a purchase-money security
interest in inventory").
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substantially engaged in selling the goods of others" and thus was ex-
cluded from the Article 9 consignment definition. 70 In applying this
standard, the court first found that DNA, as an unincorporated,
wholly owned subsidiary of Valley Media, had no legal existence of its
own. 71 Thus, because it was not a legal entity operating separately
from Valley Media, it could not have creditors of its own, and thus
could not be generally known by them as a merchant who sold the
goods of others.72
The court next considered whether the consignors had proven that
the parent company, Valley Media, satisfied the Article 9 standard for
exclusion of certain consignment transactions. 73 The standard, ac-
cording to the court, comprises two elements, each of which must be
satisfied: (1) the consignee must be "substantially engaged" in selling
others' goods, and (2) that fact must be "generally known by its credi-
tors."'74 The court found that, as a factual matter, neither element was
demonstrated. At any given time, the consigned goods constituted no
more than seventeen percent of Valley Media's total inventory,
"which is below the 20% threshold set by case law on the issue" for
the "substantially engaged" element.75 In addition, there was simply
no evidence that the "vast majority" of creditors had actual knowl-
edge of Valley Media's consignment arrangements. 76
Thus, the consignments at issue were subject to Article 9, and since
the consignors had not perfected their interests through filing, the
debtor-in-possession could use its avoiding powers under the federal
70. See id. § 9-109, cmt. 6 (noting that the rules relating to perfection apply to consigned
goods).
71. See Valley Media, 279 B.R. at 124-25 (applying U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20) (2001)). Revised
Article 9's definition of "consignment" requires that the consigned goods be delivered to a
"merchant for the purpose of sale" and "the merchant... is not generally known by its creditors
to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii) (2001).
72. Valley Media, 279 B.R. at 127.
73. Id. at 128-9.
74. Regarding the burden of proof issue, the court suggested that Revised Article 9 implicitly
placed the burden of showing that a consignment was included within Article 9 on the challeng-
ing party (e.g., the bankruptcy trustee). Id. at 131, n.54. In contrast, the former law had allo-
cated the burden in the opposite fashion-i.e., the consignors had to rebut the presumption that
their transactions were a "sale or return." Id. The court stated that no matter which way the
burden of proof was allocated, the evidence suggested that the consignment was included within
Article 9. Id.
One could certainly disagree with the court's conclusion regarding the burden of proof issue
under Revised Article 9. Because most consignments will probably fit the Article 9 definition, it
would seem more appropriate to place the burden on the consignor to show that it is excluded.
75. Id. at 124-25.
76. See id. at 132 (citing Heller Fin., Inc. v. Samuel Schick, Inc. (In re Weldo Holdings, Inc.),
248 B.R. 336, 342 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 2000)).
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Bankruptcy Code to set aside their interests.77 From a planning per-
spective, the holding in Valley Media reinforces the idea that consign-
ors should always file precautionary financing statements to protect
their interests. Particularly now that Article 9 brings most commer-
cial, large-scale consignments within its purview, it behooves most
consignors to assume that their transactions will be subject to filing
requirements.
As alluded to earlier, the revisers of Article 9 expanded the stat-
ute's scope to include transactions and types of collateral previously
excluded. 78 Former Article 9, for example, did not cover security in-
terests in any tort claims. 79 The new law brings within its scope secur-
ity interests in commercial tort claims.80 In In re Wiersma, the
bankruptcy court faced the question of whether settlement proceeds
that the debtors received from a suit against a contractor that per-
formed inadequate electrical work at the debtors' dairy were included
within a pre-revision security agreement covering general intangibles
but not tort claims. 81
The court first noted that the definition of "general intangibles"
under Revised Article 9 excludes commercial tort claims.82 Commer-
cial tort claims are in fact their own category of collateral under the
new statute.8 3 Thus, if the settlement proceeds fit the definition of
commercial tort claim (or proceeds of such a claim), they could not
constitute general intangibles. Carefully parsing the statutory defini-
tion, the court observed that to be a commercial tort claim, a claim
had to arise in tort.84 The court then looked to Idaho case law to
determine the nature of the debtors' suit against the electrical contrac-
tor. The suit was premised on breach of the contract between the par-
ties but also contained causes of action for negligence, fraud, and
77. Id. at 131-32.
78. Valley Media, 279 B.R. at 133. The court also alluded to the fact that under Revised
Article 9, consignees in unperfected consignments are deemed to have the same rights in the
consigned goods in its possession as the consignor, "for purposes of determining the rights of
creditors of, and purchasers for value of goods from, a consignee..." U.C.C. § 9-319(a) (2001).
As a result of this section, "creditors of the consignee can acquire judicial liens and security
interests in the goods." Id. cmt. 2. This section then underscores the bankruptcy trustee's ability
as a hypothetical lien creditor to avoid unperfected consignment interests.
79. See supra notes 11- 14 and accompanying text.
80. Former U.C.C. § 9-104(k) (1995).
81. See U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(12) (2001) (excluding "an assignment of a claim arising in tort,
other than a commercial tort claim").
82. 283 B.R. 294, 296 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2002).
83. Id. at 300.
84. See id. (citing Idaho's version of U.C.C. 9-102(13)).
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violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 85 The court con-
cluded that the suit "is primarily premised on a contract" between the
parties.8 6 In addition, the appended tort claims are "integrally related
to the contract" and "do not change the fundamental nature of the
action and its genesis in contract law."'8 7
Thus, the debtors' claim against the contractor was not a commer-
cial tort claim. In fact, as a "thing in action," the claim fell squarely
within the Article 9 definition of general intangible. 88 As such, the
claim and the settlement proceeds from it were subject to the credi-
tor's security agreement.89 Under both former and Revised Article 9,
contract claims were subject to Article 9, and therefore, the court un-
doubtedly reached the right result in holding that this claim was prop-
erly described in the security agreement as a general intangible.
One issue that this case does not reach, however, is whether a pre-
revision security agreement covering "general intangibles" could be
read post-revision as covering a commercial tort claim. Under old Ar-
ticle 9, the category of "general intangibles" was a catch-all and in-
cluded "any personal property (including things in action) other than
goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, investment
property, rights to proceeds of written letters of credit, and money." 90
Hence, theoretically, commercial tort claims would have been "gen-
eral intangibles" under the old law. At the same time, since security
interests in tort claims were excluded from former Article 9, secured
transactions in such property would have been covered by other law. 9t
After the effective date of Revised Article 9, security interests in com-
mercial tort claims are subject to the new law. The secured party
might attempt to argue that its security agreement covering general
intangibles should be adequate to pick up commercial tort claims, at
least for the one-year grace period provided by the transition rules.92
One of the Official Comments to Revised Article 9 suggests, how-
ever, that this argument should not be successful. The comment indi-
cates that the security agreement reflects the parties' intent at the time
85. Id. Under new Article 9, a commercial tort claim "means a claim arising in tort with
respect to which: (A) the claimant is an organization; or (B) the claimant is an individual and the
claim: (i) arose in the course of the claimant's business or profession; and (ii) does not include
damages arising out of personal injury to or the death of an individual." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(13)
(2001).
86. Wiersma, 283 B.R. at 302.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 303.
90. Id.
91. Former U.C.C. § 9-106 (1995).
92. Id. § 9-104 (k).
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of contracting.93 At that time, both debtor and creditor presumably
understood the term "general intangibles" not to include tort claims
of any kind because of former Article 9's exclusion of security inter-
ests in such claims. In addition, new Article 9 prohibits descriptions of
commercial tort claims by "only by type of collateral '94 and bans af-
ter-acquired property clauses relating to commercial tort claims. 95
Thus, a given commercial tort claim must be in existence at the time
that the parties enter into the security agreement.96 The security
agreement must also describe the claim with some degree of
specificity.97
III. ATTACHMENT AND PERFECTION ISSUES
Attachment is equivalent to the enforceability of a security interest.
A security interest "attaches to collateral when it becomes enforcea-
ble against the debtor with respect to the collateral. ''98 New Article 9
essentially preserves the three steps for attachment required under
former Article 9: (1) the secured party has to have given value to the
debtor;99 (2) the debtor has to have rights (or the power to transfer
rights) in the collateral; 100 and (3) the debtor "has authenticated a se-
curity agreement that provides a description of the collateral.' 01 The
secured party may enforce the security interest against the debtor and
third parties only after the three steps of attachment have been
satisfied.
93. Revised Article 9's transition rules provide for one-year grace periods in a number of
situations involving changes in the mechanisms of attachment and perfection. See U.C.C. §§ 9-
703(b), 9-704(1), 9-705(a) (2001).
94. Id. § 9-703, cmt. 3.
95. Id. § 9-108(e)(1).
96. Id. § 9-204(b)(2).
97. Id. § 9-108, cmt. 5.
98. See id. (suggesting that a description such as "all tort claims arising out of the explosion of
debtor's factory" would be adequate).
99. U.C.C. § 9-203(a) (2001). The parties may postpone the time of attachment by agreement.
Id.
100. U.C.C. § 9-203 (b)(1) (2001). "Value" is defined broadly in Article 1, and includes "a
binding commitment to extend credit" as well as "any consideration sufficient to support a sim-
ple contract." U.C.C. § 1-204 (Official Text 2002) [former § 1-201(44) (Official Text 2001)]. Ar-
ticle 1 was extensively amended in 2002, and all references to Article 1 will be to the revised
version of it. To date, only Virginia, Texas, and the Virgin Islands have adopted new Article 1.
Nat'l Conference Comm'rs Unif. State Laws, Revised Uniform Commercial Code Art. 1, Gen.
Provisions (2001), at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformacts-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uccl.asp
(last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
101. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(2) (2001). For a discussion of the concept of "rights in collateral," see
Margit Livingston, Certainty, Efficiency, and Realism: Rights in Collateral under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 73 N.C. L. REV. 115 (1994).
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Beyond enforceability, every secured party seeks to have its secur-
ity interest perfected. Perfection, of course, allows security interests
to survive the bankruptcy trustee's avoiding power under the so-called
"strong arm" clause of the federal bankruptcy code, 10 2 and first-in-
time perfection permits the secured party to have priority over later
claimants in both bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy settings.10 3 The ba-
sic concept of perfection involves giving notice to the world of the
existence of possible security interests in certain collateral of a partic-
ular debtor. 10 4 The most common method of perfection is filing of a
financing statement in a public recording office t05-usually the appro-
priate jurisdiction's Secretary of State office.
One of the notable achievements of new Article 9 is its simplifica-
tion of the filing rules. Under the revised law, the debtor's location
almost always controls the place of filing' 06 whereas under former Ar-
ticle 9, a set of virtually impenetrable choice-of-law rules determined
the appropriate jurisdiction in which to file.107 In addition, Revised
102. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (2001). If the collateral consists of standing timber, the security
agreement must also include a description of the land involved. Id. Revised Article 9 provides
for alternatives to the authenticated security agreement for certain types of collateral. Id. (B)
(possession of the collateral by the secured party pursuant to the debtor's security agreement);
id. (C) (delivery of collateral consisting of a certificated security to the secured party pursuant to
the debtor's security agreement); id. (D) (secured party's control of deposit accounts, electronic
chattel paper, investment property, or letter-of-credit rights pursuant to the debtor's security
agreement).
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2003) (granting the trustee in bankruptcy the status of a hypo-
thetical creditor with a judicial lien on all of the debtor's non-exempt property at the time of the
commencement of the bankruptcy case). By virtue of this section and its interplay with Article 9
priority rules, the trustee can avoid unperfected security interests. See In re Mill Concepts Corp.,
123 B.R. 938, 943 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (noting that the "strong-arm clause was added to the
[bankruptcy] statute in 1910 in order to avoid 'the evil of secret liens"').
104. As under old Article 9, most of the new Article 9 priority rules allow a perfected secured
party to have priority over a later secured party, lien creditor, or non-ordinary-course buyer. See
U.C.C. H8 9-322(a)(1) (ranking conflicting security interests "according to priority in time of
filing or perfection"); 9-317(a) (providing that an earlier perfected or filed security party trumps
a later lien creditor); 9-317(b) (2001) (not allowing non-ordinary-course buyers to take free of
prior perfected security interests).
105. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 763 (1995)
(stating that the Article 9 drafters "believed that, to have the rights of a perfected secured credi-
tor, normally one should undertake some action, either filing or possession, which would put a
diligent searcher on notice of the secured party's claim.").
106. See U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (2001) (stating that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided . .. a financing
statement must be filed to perfect all security interests and agricultural liens.").
107. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (2001) (providing that "while a debtor is located in a jurisdiction,
the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection,
and the priority of a security interest in collateral"). The debtor's location for Article 9 purposes
varies depending upon whether the debtor is an individual, an unregistered organization, or a
registered organization. See § 9-307(b)(1) (2001) (stating that individuals are located at their
principal residence); id. (b)(2), (3) (stating that an organization is located at its place of business
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Article 9 has eliminated dual filing requirements and extinguished
county filing, 108 except with respect to certain real-estate related col-
lateral. 109 Almost all financing statements will be filed with the Secre-
tary of State in the state where the debtor is located.
The revisers streamlined not only the choice-of-law rules but also
pared down information required on the financing statement itself.
Under former Article 9, a financing statement needed the names and
addresses of both the debtor and the secured party, a description or
indication of the collateral, and the debtor's signature. 110 New Article
9 demands only the barest minimum of information on a financing
statement: the debtor's name, the name of the secured party or its
representative, and an indication of the collateral.11 Although the
filing officer may, and in fact must, reject a financing statement that
does not contain certain additional information," 2 a financing state-
ment complying with the statutory minimum is sufficient if it makes its
way into the public record." 3
The courts have decided just a few cases under Revised Article 9
that deal directly with attachment and perfection issues. As with
many of the cases rendered since the new law went into effect, some
of these decisions touch on the impact of the transition rules. Revised
Article 9's transition rules dictate to what extent the new law governs
particular transactions and to what extent actions, particularly with
regard to perfection, remain effective after July 1, 2001.
A. Attachment
As mentioned earlier, Revised Article 9 retains the standard three
steps for attachment that existed under the prior law.114 As before,
or, if it has more than one place of business, at its chief executive office); id. (e) (stating that a
registered organization is located in the state under whose laws it is organized).
108. See former U.C.C. § 9-103 (1995). See also ROBERT L. JORDAN ET AL., SECURED TRANS-
ACTIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 96 (5th ed. 2000) (noting that "9-103 cannot be counted a
success .... [p]roblems continue to arise, and it has been one of the most litigated provisions of
the Code.").
109. See U.C.C. § 9-501(a)(2) (2001) (requiring a central filing for most transactions).
110. See U.C.C. § 9-501(a)(1) (2001) (requiring filing in real estate mortgage records for "as-
extracted collateral or timber to be cut" or fixture filings).
111. See former U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1995).
112. See U.C.C. § 9-502(a) (2001). For real-estate-related filings, additional information is re-
quired, including a description of the real property involved. Id. (b).
113. See U.C.C. § 9-520(a) (2001) (requiring the filing officer to reject a record that does not
comply with § 9-516(a)) and § 9-516(b) (4), (5) (requiring a financing statement to contain the
debtor's and secured party's mailing addresses, a designation of the debtor as an individual or an
organization, and if the debtor is an organization, certain information about the organization).
114. See U.C.C. §§ 9-520(c), 9-502, cmt. 4 (providing that if the filing officer accepts the record
with the minimal information, "it is effective nevertheless.").
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any security must contain a description of the collateral.115 The re-
vised statute reiterates the old law's standard for sufficiency of de-
scriptions: "a description of personal or real property is sufficient,
whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies what is de-
scribed. 11 6 In addition, the new law adds types of descriptions that
are presumptively sufficient.1 17
As did former Article 9, the new statute "rejects any requirement
that a description is insufficient unless it is exact and detailed (the so-
called 'serial number' test)."' 118 Unfortunately, for one would-be se-
cured creditor, even this liberal description requirement did not pre-
vent it from failing to attach its security interest. In Deere Credit, Inc.
v. Pickle Logging, Inc. (In re Pickle Logging, Inc.), Deere Credit, Inc.,
had attempted to take a security interest in a particular piece of the
debtor's equipment, namely a 548G skidder with a specific serial num-
ber.119 Both the security agreement and the financing statement, how-
ever, listed the collateral as a 648G skidder with a serial number that
was one digit off the correct number.120
The bankruptcy court in analyzing the description issue did not
make it clear whether the issue is different depending on whether one
is judging a security agreement or a financing statement. The court
appeared to apply a unitary analysis that comprised both documents.
Of course, in the end, it did not matter whether the description is suf-
ficient on one document and not the other. Both unperfected and
unattached security interests are avoidable in bankruptcy.121
In reaching its conclusion that the description was inadequate, the
court delineated the basic function of a description of collateral: "The
description merely needs to raise a red flag to a third party indicating
that more investigation may be necessary to determine whether or not
an item is subject to a security agreement. 1' 22 The court went on to
115. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
116. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (2001).
117. Id. § 9-108(a).
118. Descriptions may identify the collateral by "(1) specific listing; (2) category; (3) . . . a
type of collateral defined in [the Uniform Commercial Code]; (4) quantity; (5) computational or
allocation formula or procedure; or (6) . . . any other method, if the identity of the collateral is
objectively determinable." Id. (b).
119. Id. cmt. 2.
120. 286 B.R. 181, 182-83 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2002). The model 548G skidder in question bore
the serial number DW548GX568154. Id. at 183.
121. Both documents listed the collateral as a model 648G skidder with a serial number of
DW648GX568154. Id.
122. The trustee in bankruptcy (or the debtor-in-possession in a chapter 11 reorganization)
may avoid unperfected security interests using its hypothetical lien creditor status given by the
"strong arm clause." 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2003). Unattached security interests will be un-
perfected as well since attachment is a prerequisite to perfection under state law. U.C.C. § 9-
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find that dual errors regarding the serial number and the model num-
ber of the skidder were fatal to the creditor. Because the erroneous
serial number incorporated the erroneous model number (i.e., 648),
the two numbers were consistent with one another, and an inquiring
party would not notice anything amiss. 123 Adding to the confusion,
the debtor in fact owned at least two model 648G skidders along with
some 548G skidders. 124
The secured party in Pickle Logging is certainly not the first credi-
tor to create problems for itself by being too specific. 125 Both old and
new Article 9 encourage creditors to use general descriptions, espe-
cially on financing statements. 126 In this case, the security interest
would probably have survived in the debtor's bankruptcy if the credi-
tor had described the collateral on the financing statement as "skid-
der" or even "equipment." To adequately serve the description's
evidentiary function on the security agreement, 127 the creditor would
probably have had to get at least the model number of the skidder and
part of the serial number correct, given that the debtor had more than
one 548G skidder.
In In re Stout,1 2 8 the bankruptcy court confronted a seeming lacuna
in Revised Article 9's transition rules, namely, whether a security
agreement that was insufficient under former Article 9 could become
sufficient merely through the enactment of Revised Article 9. The
court ultimately concluded no, although one might quarrel with the
result. Under Kansas's former Article 9, for an interest in crops to
become attached a security agreement had to contain a description of
the land on which the crops were grown.' 29 However, Kansas's Re-
308(a) (2001). In addition, an unattached security interest is unenforceable against the debtor
and third parties. Id. § 9-203(a), (b).
123. Pickle Logging, 286 B.R. at 184.
124. Id. (stating that "[a] potential purchaser of the 548G skidder in dispute here could easily
assume that the skidder is not covered by either the security agreement or the financing
statement.").
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Shelby County State Bank v. Van Diest Supply Co., 303 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir.
2002) (holding that creditor's security interest was restricted to only the products it sold to the
debtor rather than all inventory because of a modifying clause added to the collateral descrip-
tion); Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Gibson Lumber Co., 96 B.R. 751, 754-55 (W.D. Ky. 1989)
(holding that an omnibus description clause coupled with a specific listing of items created an
ambiguity regarding the property that the parties intended to encumber).
127. See U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (allowing supergeneric collateral descriptions on financing
statements).
128. See id. § 9-108, cmt. 2.
129. 284 B.R. 511 (Bankr. Dist. Kan. 2002).
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vised Article 9 dispensed with the requirement that a security agree-
ment contain such a description. 130
First National Bank ("Bank") provided Sam and Debra Stout
("debtors") financing for their farming operation, taking a security in-
terest in the debtors' crops. 131 Two security agreements were entered
into and signed by the parties before the enactment of Kansas's Re-
vised Article 9.132 Ultimately, the debtors filed a petition under chap-
ter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code. 133 As debtors under chapter 12, they
became debtors-in-possession and thereby acquired all the avoiding
powers of a chapter 11 trustee in bankruptcy. 134 As such, they were
entitled to use the "strong arm clause" to avoid any unperfected se-
curity interests.135
The parties agreed that neither security agreement conformed to
the requirements of former Article 9, and that therefore the Bank's
security interests in the crops were not attached under former Article
9.136 As unattached security interests, the Bank's interests would be
subordinated to the interests of a lien creditor and thus avoidable by
the debtors under the strong arm clause. The Bank argued, however,
that upon the enactment of Revised Article 9 its interests in the crops
attached, and became perfected. 137 The Bank asserted that the
change in the law cured the infirmities of the security agreement, and
that therefore attachment occurred at the time the new law was
enacted. 138
The court noted that no case law, either inside or outside the juris-
diction, nor scholarship provided guidance on resolving this transi-
tional issue. 139 Therefore, the court focused solely on the transitional
rules under Part 7 of Revised Article 9 to resolve the dispute. 140 The
court found that the transition rules applied specifically to three situa-
130. 284 B.R. at 512 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-203(1)(a) (1996)).
131. Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-203(b)(1)-(3)(A) (Supp. 2001)).
132. Id.
133. These agreements covered growing crops and were executed on February 26, 1993, and
May 2, 2000, respectively. Id.
134. 284 B.R. at 511-512.
135. 11 U.S.C. § 1203 (2003).
136. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(2003).
137. In re Stout, 284 B.R. at 512.
138. The parties had no disagreement over the adequacy of the Bank's financing statements.
Id. at 511-12. Rather, the core dispute was whether enactment of Revised Article 9 operated to
attach (and thus perfect) the Bank's security interest.
139. 284 B.R. at 512. The Bank argued that as attachment occurred at the time of new Article
9's enactment, as a secured creditor, it had priority to the crops of the debtor. The Bank argued
that its interest was superior to that of the Stouts, the debtors-in-possession, at the time of the
debtors' bankruptcy filing.
140. Id. at 512-13.
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tions, not including the one before the court, 141  and that
"[u]nfortunately for the Bank .... the transition rules suggest that,
while faulty pre-enactment perfection is remediable, failed pre-enact-
ment attachment is not."'1 42 The court believed that the drafters' fail-
ure to address the issue of what occurs to a security interest that was
un-attached pre-enactment, but would become attached post-enact-
ment indicated that indeed the security interest must remain unat-
tached. 143 Therefore, the Bank's interest was unattached and thus
unperfected, 144 and the debtors' status as lien creditors trumped the
Bank's interest.
Though the court in Stout painstakingly analyzes the transition rules
in an attempt to achieve a statutorily sound result, one may question
the court's ultimate conclusion. Revised Article 9's default transition
rule basically states that unless an exception applies, the new law ap-
plies to all transactions within its scope. 145 All of the specific transi-
tion rules cited by the court relate to security interests that are
enforceable immediately before the new law's effective date. 146 As
the court pointed out, the drafters did not address the issue of security
interests that were unenforceable under former Article 9.147 From
this omission, the court concluded that "the Kansas legislature did not
intend to cure defective pre-enactment attachments by the enactment
of the revision."' 148
One could just as readily conclude, on the other hand, that the Arti-
cle 9 revisers believed that they had dealt with the issue through the
default transition rule. In other words, the new law applies to all
transactions unless a specific transition rule specifies otherwise. It is
doubtful that the revisers anticipated many situations in which unen-
forceable pre-enactment security interests would become enforceable
post-enactment. After all, the requirements for attachment are basi-
141. 284 B.R. at 513 (citing KAN. STAT ANN. § 84-9-701 (Supp. 2001)).
142. 284 B.R. at 514 (describing the three "permutations" covered by the transition rules as
follows: "(1) a security interest that is enforceable pre-enactment and post-enactment [§ 9-
703(a)]; (2) a security interest that is enforceable pre-enactment but not enforceable post-enact-
ment [§ 9-703(b)]; and (3) a security interest that is enforceable pre-enactment but is un-
perfected pre-enactment [§ 9-703(c)].").
143. 284 B.R. at 513.
144. 284 B.R. at 513 (stating that "[tihe drafters of the revised law did not directly address this
topic and this omission, in this Court's view, seals the Bank's fate.").
145. Attachment is a prerequisite to perfection under both the old and the new law. See
former U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1995) & Revised U.C.C. § 9-308(a) (2001).
146. See U.C.C. § 9-702(a) (2001).
147. Stout, 284 B.R. at 514 (citing §§ 9-703(a), (b), 9-704).
148. Id. at 514-15.
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cally identical under the old and new versions of Article 9.149 In addi-
tion, it is important to consider the legislative purpose in requiring a
land description for growing crops in the security agreement. The Of-
ficial Comment to former § 9-203 indicates that the drafters thought
that such a description would be an aid to identifying the specific
crops subject to the security interest. 150 Although nothing in the new
law indicates why the land description requirement was dropped for
crops, but not for timber, one might speculate that the revisers
thought that crops, in some cases, could be sufficiently described with-
out a reference to land-for example, "all the debtor's growing corn
crop" would seem to be sufficient to identify the collateral without a
land description. 15' Rather than mechanically concluding that the old
security agreement was lacking a land description and was thus unen-
forceable, the court might have more appropriately considered
whether the security agreement sufficiently identified the crop collat-
eral in question. 52
Revised Article 9 continues to require that the debtor have rights in
the collateral (or the power to transfer rights) as a necessary element
for attachment of the secured party's security interest. As with former
Article 9, the new statute leaves the phrase "rights in collateral" basi-
cally undefined and leaves the issue to the courts for further develop-
ment. In Arcadia Financial, Ltd. v. Southwest-Tex Leasing, Co.,
Inc.,t53 the court held that the debtor never acquired sufficient rights
in the collateral for the creditor's security interest to attach.
Advantage Rent-A-Car ("Advantage")54 entered into an agree-
ment with Lone Star Used Cars ("Lone Star"), under which Advan-
tage agreed to sell cars to Lone Star. 155 Lone Star would inspect the
cars over a two- to three-week period, provide Advantage with its ap-
149. Id. at 515.
150. Compare former U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (1995) with Revised U.C.C. § 9-203(b) (2001).
151. Former U.C.C. § 9-203, cmt. 2 (1995) (noting that "[i]n the case of crops growing or to be
grown or timber to be cut the best identification is by describing the land").
152. Under Revised Article 9, "a description of personal or real property is sufficient, whether
or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies what is described." U.C.C. § 9-108(a) (2001). See
id., cmt. 2 (stating that the requirement of collateral description in security agreements is "evi-
dentiary" in nature and that the description need not be "exact and detailed" as long as it
'make[s] possible the identification of the collateral").
153. There is no question that both old and new Article 9 pursued the goal of relieving se-
cured creditors of burdensome legal strictures and thus simplifying the creation and enforcement
of secured transactions. See, e.g., Homer Kripke, The "Secured Transactions" Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 35 VA. L. REv. 577, 584 (1949) (asserting that a law that "hinders
[secured transactions], or freezes business and financial practice in the grip of unsuited legal
rules, will be of no assistance and may be a positive hindrance to commerce.").
154. 78 S.W. 3d 619 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).
155. Advantage Rent-A-Car was a trade name of Southwest-Tex Leasing Co., Inc. Id. at 620.
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proval of the cars, and thereafter receive title and provide Advantage
with payment. Arcadia Financial ("Arcadia") provided retail financ-
ing for Lone Star's customers. 156 Arcadia and Lone Star's agreement
provided that Lone Star warranted that title to the cars was held by
Lone Star, free of any liens and that Lone Star give Arcadia the title
to the vehicle at the time of the sale to its customer. 157
In July and August 1998, Lone Star purportedly sold four vehicles
that it had acquired from Advantage, and Arcadia accepted assign-
ment of the retail installment contracts Lone Star entered into with
the customers. 158 But Lone Star never provided Advantage with pay-
ment for the automobiles, and the transfer of title to Lone Star was
never effectuated. 159 Hence, Arcadia never took the titles to the vehi-
cles when it accepted the installment contracts.160
When Lone Star went out of business soon thereafter, Arcadia de-
manded that Lone Star repurchase the installment contracts on the
vehicles. 161 When Lone Star refused, Arcadia asked Advantage to
provide it with the titles to the vehicles so that Arcadia could perfect
its security interests in the installment contracts. 162 Advantage re-
fused, and Arcadia brought suit against Advantage, alleging that Ad-
vantage had converted its security interests in the vehicles.1 63
On appeal, Arcadia argued that Lone Star did acquire sufficient
ownership of the vehicles for attachment to occur.1 64 The Texas Court
of Appeals, however, held otherwise: "the purported sale of the vehi-
cles to Lone Star was incomplete because Lone Star failed to pay Ad-
vantage for the vehicles pursuant to their agreement," thus failing to
acquire ownership.1 65 The appellate court acknowledged that under
the U.C.C. title normally passes from seller to buyer upon physical
delivery of the goods. 166 Since Advantage had delivered the four ve-
hicles to Lone Star, arguably title to them passed to Lone Star. How-
156. Id. at 621.
157. Arcadia was given an assignment of retail installment contracts entered into between
Lone Star and its customers. Id.
158. Id.
159. Arcadia Financial, 78 S.W.3d at 621.
160. Id.
161. Id. Lone Star instead "provided letters of guarantee of title, representing to Arcadia that
the original Texas certificates of title would be submitted within thirty days." Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 621-22.
164. Arcadia Financial, 78 S.W.3d at 622. The District Court for Travis County, Texas, ruled
in favor of Advantage, and Arcadia appealed the judgment.
165. Id. at 623.
166. Id. at 625. Arcadia's argument that it was a buyer in the ordinary course of business also
failed since the evidence showed that Arcadia was aware during its relationship with Lone Star
that at different points Lone Star did not possess title to the vehicles. Still, Arcadia agreed to the
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ever, both the Texas certificate of title law and the agreement between
Advantage and Lone Star suggested that title did not pass until trans-
fer of the certificate of title and payment in full of Advantage.
Relying on the certificate of title statute and the terms of the Lone
Star-Advantage agreement, the court held that the ownership of the
vehicles remained with Advantage at all relevant times.167 Thus, Lone
Star did not have sufficient rights in the vehicles to support attach-
ment of Arcadia's security interest.1 6s On its face, the court's holding
conflicts with the U.C.C. Under § 2-401(1), a seller's retention of "ti-
tle" in goods delivered to a buyer is deemed to be the reservation of a
security interest only.169 Hence, Lone Star would have acquired own-
ership of the vehicles delivered to it.
On the other hand, the state certificate of title law forbids subse-
quent sales of motor vehicles "unless the owner designated in the cer-
tificate of title transfers the certificate of title at the time of the
sale. 1 70 Because Advantage had not transferred the certificates to
Lone Star, Lone Star could not sell the vehicles to its customers.
Given that most parties in transactions involving motor vehicles would
demand to see a certificate of title before assuming that one in posses-
sion of a vehicle owned it, the court was probably correct in holding
that Arcadia's security interest did not attach.
B. Perfection
In contrast to Stout's somewhat inflexible reading of new Article 9,
three recent bankruptcy cases interpreting perfection requirements
have embraced the liberality of the revised law and sanctioned financ-
ing statements with technical errors. In Grabowski v. Deere & Co. (In
re Grabowski), Ronald and Trenna Grabowski ("debtors") secured
loans from two separate banks, Bank of America and South Pointe
Bank. 171 Bank of America perfected a security interest in the debtor's
"[i]nventory, [c]hattel [p]aper, [a]ccounts, [e]quipment, and [g]eneral
[i]ntangibles" by filing a financing statement on December 31, 1998.172
In its financing statement, Bank of America listed the debtors person-
assignment of the retail installment contracts. As Lone Star did not possess the titles to the
vehicles, Arcadia therefore had to have been aware that the title was held by another person. Id.
167. See id. at 623 (citing Texas's version of U.C.C. § 2-401(2)).
168. Id. at 623-624 (noting that the parties had stipulated that "the sale of any vehicle to Lone
Star was contingent upon Advantage's receipt of payment in full from Lone Star.").
169. Id. at 624.
170. U.C.C. § 2-401(1) (2001).
171. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 501.071(a) (Vernon 1995).
172. 277 B.R. 388, 389 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2002). Interestingly, the court applied new Article 9 to
this case even though the debtors filed their chapter 11 petition in April 2001. Id. at 390.
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ally along with their business address. 173 Thereafter, South Pointe
Bank provided the debtors with a loan, taking and perfecting a secur-
ity interest in the Grabowskis' equipment described on the lender's
financing statement as "JD 1995 9600 combine, JD 925 Flex Platform,
JD 4630 Tractor, JD 630 Disk 28' 1998."174 South Pointe's financing
statement listed the debtors' location as their personal address.
The Grabowskis filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and moved
to determine the validity of the two banks' security interests in the
items of equipment listed in South Pointe's financing statement. 175
South Pointe asserted that it was entitled to priority in the items of
equipment based on the vague nature of Bank of America's descrip-
tion of collateral and its listing of the business address as the debtors'
location. South Pointe argued that "a subsequent lender would rea-
sonably conclude that Bank of America's intended security was the
personal property of the debtors' business rather than equipment used
in the debtors' [personal] farming operation. ' 176
The bankruptcy court found that Bank of America had priority due
to its first-in-time financing statement, and was entitled to the dis-
puted equipment. The court stated that Bank of America's financing
statement was consistent with the "exceedingly general standard for
describing collateral in a financing statement, which is new to the
UCC under revised Article 9.''177 With regards to the disputed ad-
dress, the court found that the debtor's address was not meant to be
indicative of the location of the collateral, but rather "merely pro-
vided a means by which subsequent lenders could contact the debtors
to inquire. '178
The court, at several points throughout its decision, acknowledged
the "inquiry notice function" of describing collateral. 179 According to
the court, a financing statement served this function under both the
old and new versions of Article 9.180 In addition, the court observed
that Revised Article 9 has even further liberalized the description re-
quirement for a financing statement by allowing creditors to use
173. Id. at 389. The bank's description of the collateral in the security agreement was identi-
cal to that in the financing statement.
174. Id.
175. 277 B.R. at 390. South Pointe's security agreement with the debtors described the collat-
eral more generally as "Equipment: All equipment including . . . farm machinery and
equipment."
176. Id. at 389.
177. Id. at 390.
178. Id. at 391.
179. Id. at 392.
180. Grabowski. 277 B.R. at 391.
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supergeneric descriptions such as "all assets" and permitting descrip-
tions by "type" or "category." 181 This relaxed standard harmonizes
with the general purpose of a filed financing statement.
Another bankruptcy case decided under Revised Article 9 reflects
similar recognition of the new law's liberal filing requirements. In
Hergert v. Bank of the West (In re Hergert), Neil and Marie Hergert
("debtors") obtained three loans from Pacific One Bank ("Pacific
One") for operation of their farming business. 182 Two of the loans
were commercial in nature, granting Pacific One a security interest in
the debtors' equipment, inventory, crops, and other assets. 183 To per-
fect the interests under these two loans, Pacific One filed both UCC-1
and UCC-1F (farm products) financing statements. 8 4 The third loan
granted Pacific One a security interest in the debtors' manufactured
home, and its interest was noted on the certificate of title to the
home. 185 Both the UCC-1 and the certificate of title stated a Portland,
Oregon mailing address for Pacific One.186 Further, the UCC-1 state-
ment listed an additional address for acknowledgment purposes in
Nampa, Idaho, and the UCC-1F (farm products) financing statement
gave only the Nampa address for Pacific One.' 87 As part of a merger
in 1998, Pacific One became Bank of the West ("Bank"), and the new
entity acquired all of Pacific One's assets.' 8 The Bank continued to
use the Portland address.189
The debtors filed a chapter 12 bankruptcy petition in 2001, and
brought an adversary proceeding to declare the Bank's security inter-
ests unperfected. 190 The debtors, as debtors-in-possession, argued
that the Bank's failure to correct the secured party's name and ad-
dress on the original certificate of title and financing statements
caused its security interests to become unperfected. 191 The bank-
ruptcy court quickly disposed of this issue with respect to the certifi-
cate of title for the debtors' manufactured home. It stated that where
an assignee succeeds to a lienholder's interest, it need not amend the
certificate of title to reflect the assignment if the interest it succeeds to
181. Id.
182. Id. (citing U.C.C. §§ 9-504(2) (2001)).





188. Id. at 60-61.
189. In re Hergert, 275 B.R. at 60.
190. Id. at 61. At some point after the merger, the Bank ceased to use the Nampa address.
Id.
191. Id. at 60.
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is the same as the original lienholder's. 192 Thus, Bank of the West
remained perfected as to Pacific One's interest in the manufactured
home.
Exercising an abundance of caution, the court then analyzed the
sufficiency of the two financing statements under both old and new
Article 9 even though it correctly concluded that new Article 9 gov-
erned the issue. 193 The court easily determined that Bank of the West
remained perfected in the non-farm assets under Pacific One's origi-
nal UCC-1 financing statement. The merger of Pacific One into Bank
of the West occurred when old Article 9 was still in effect, and the
court stated that even under the old law, a change in the secured
party's name and/or address did not necessarily render the filed fi-
nancing statement seriously misleading. 194 The court pointed out that
the listing of the Portland address still would lead an inquiring third
party to the correct secured party. 195 Once new Article 9 went into
effect, no further action was required under the revised law to main-
tain perfection, and thus, the Bank's security interest continued to be
perfected.' 96
Regarding the UCC-1F (farm products), Bank of the West faced the
problem that, at some point, the Nampa, Idaho, address became inef-
fective for purposes of reaching the secured party. 197 As such, the
UCC-1F became seriously misleading, and Bank of the West's security
interest would have become unperfected under Idaho's former Article
9.198
In discussing the sufficiency of the original UCC-1F (farm products)
under new Article 9, the court was forced to integrate Idaho's non-
uniform amendment to Revised Article 9, requiring farm products fi-
nancing statements to contain the secured party's name, address, and
signature. t 99 The court noted that the absence of the secured party's
address and signature is grounds for a filing office to reject the state-
ment, but under the new law, only the parties' names and an indica-
192. Id. at 61 n.1 (stating that "this dispute relates solely to the issue regarding the accuracy of
the names and addresses shown for the secured party" on the date of the bankruptcy petition).
193. Id. at 61-62.
194. In re Hergert, 275 B.R. at 62-65 (citing Idaho's version of Revised U.C.C. § 9-702(a)).
195. Id. at 63.
196. Id. at 63 n.6.
197. Id. at 64.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 64. Former IDAHO CODE § 28-9-402(9) stated that "(9) [a] financing statement for
farm products is sufficient if it contains the following information: (a) The name and address of
the debtor; (b) The debtor's signature; (c) The name, address, and signature of the secured
party." Id.
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tion of the collateral are required for a sufficient filing.20° Thus, the
court found that as the failure to provide an address of the secured
party no longer renders such a financing statement filed for farming
products ineffective, one that has provided a misleading address is
likewise effective. 20 1
Another recent bankruptcy case, Nazar v. Bucklin National Bank
(In re Erwin),20 2 focuses on the all-important question of the debtor's
name on the financing statement. Because inquiring parties ordinarily
start with the debtor's name in undertaking a search of the public
records, Article 9 demands that the filing secured party set forth the
debtor's name correctly on the financing statement to gain perfection
of its security interest. Clarifying the old law, new Article 9 states that
"a financing statement that fails sufficiently to provide the name of
the debtor ... is seriously misleading. '20 3 The new statute then pro-
vides a loophole that saves financing statements with errors in the
debtor's name. If "a search of the records of the filing office under
the debtor's correct name, using the filing office's standard search
logic, if any, would disclose a financing statement that fails sufficiently
to provide the name of the debtor .... the name provided does not
make the financing statement seriously misleading. '20 4
In the Erwin case, the debtor's legal name was "Michael A. Erwin,"
and the secured party, Bucklin National Bank, had filed a financing
statement setting forth the debtor's name as "Mike Erwin. '20 5 In the
debtor's bankruptcy, the trustee tried to avoid the Bank's security in-
200. See In re Hergert, 275 B.R. at 65 (citing IDAHO CODE § 28-9-502(e)).
201. Id. at 67 (stating that "[tihe structure of New Article 9 makes the absence of a name or
address grounds for the filing officer to reject the statement, but if accepted for filing it will be
effective.").
202. Id. at 67-68. The court's analysis of the change in the secured party's name from Pacific
One to Bank of the West tracked its earlier discussion of that issue with respect of the non-farm
UCC-1. However, again the court had to grapple, at least briefly, with another of Idaho's non-
uniform amendments to Revised Article 9-this one requiring farm products financing state-
ments to be amended within three months of any material changes. Id. at 68 (citing IDAHO
CODE § 28-9-502 (f)). Because the debtors' bankruptcy petition was filed within three months of
the effective date of Idaho's Revised Article 9, the court stopped the clock and held that it need
not reach the question of whether the changes were material. Id.
The court also alluded to the possibility that an error in the secured party's name could "give
rise to an estoppel in favor of a particular holder of a conflicting claim to the collateral." Id. at
66 (citing IDAHO CODE § 28-9-506, cmt. 2). In other words, if a particular searcher could show
that it detrimentally relied on the wrong name of the secured party in the financing statement,
such a searcher might be able to estop the earlier party from asserting its priority. See Harry C.
Sigman, Twenty Questions About Filing Under Revised Article 9: The Rules of the Game, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 861, 866 (1999) (discussing the estoppel issue).
203. No. 02-10227, 02-5176, 2003 WL 21513158 (Bankr. D. Kan. June 27, 2003).
204. U.C.C. § 9-506(b) (2001).
205. Id. (c).
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terest as unperfected because the debtor's name was listed incor-
rectly. 206 The court held that the secured party's financing statement
was valid, even though an electronic search of the filing records under
the name "Michael A. Erwin" did not reveal the financing
statement.2
07
The court stated that the traditional "reasonably diligent searcher"
test survived the enactment of Revised Article 9, at least with respect
to debtors who are individuals. 20 8 Article 9, the court noted, does not
define "correct name" or even "name" for individual debtors, 20 9 and
there is no reason to think that the drafters necessarily meant "legal
name" when they required filing parties to place the debtor's name on
a financing statement.210 In this case, the debtor frequently used the
name "Mike Erwin,"21' and the court held that his nickname was in
fact one of his "names" or a "correct name" for him. 212 As such, it
was sufficient for use on a financing statement. Searchers could fairly
be required to use "reasonable diligence" in seeking out financing
statements naming the debtor, and such diligence demanded searches
under "Erwin" or "M. Erwin," both of which would have revealed the
Bank's financing statement.213
In sum, the bankruptcy courts in both Grabowski and Herbert accu-
rately read Revised Article 9 as requiring only a minimum amount of
information on a filed financing statement-the barest essentials nec-
essary to set a searching party on a trail of inquiry. They also appro-
priately applied the Revised Article 9's transition rules to allow
206. In re Erwin, 2003 WL 21513158, at *2.
207. Id. at *3.
208. Id. at *12.
209. Id. at *8. Interestingly, the court applied Revised Article 9 in judging the sufficiency of
the Bank's financing statement even though it was filed in 1999. Referring to one of the new
law's transition rules, the court stated that "if the pre-enactment security interest did not satisfy
the perfection requirements of revised Article Nine, the creditor had one year from enactment,
or until July 1, 2002, to satisfy the perfection requirements of revised Article Nine." Id. at *1
(citing Kansas' version of U.C.C. § 9-703(b)(3)). The court ignored, however, the transition rule
that allows pre-enactment financing statements to remain effective for the normal five-year pe-
riod without refiling by the creditor. U.C.C. § 9-705(c) (2001). Arguably, the Bank's financing
statement should be have been evaluated by old Article 9 standards. Given that the court em-
ployed the "reasonably diligent searcher" standard in any event, its reliance on new Article 9 did
not determine the case's outcome.
210. Erwin, 2003 WL 21513158, at *6.
211. Id. at *10.
212. The debtor's name on all of the Bank's loan documents was "Mike Erwin," including the
W-9 tax form request for the debtor's taxpayer identification number and certification. Id. at *2.
213. The court emphasized that nothing in Article 9 mandates the use of an individual
debtor's full legal name on a financing statement. Id. at *10. In fact, the Kansas administrative
regulations implementing new Article 9 suggest "human judgment still plays a role in searches
for individual debtor names 'that are not automated."' Id. at *7.
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financing statements potentially invalid under the old law to become
valid under the liberalized rules of the new law. The holding in the
Erwin case is more problematic. It is fairly clear that the revisers
sought to decrease the number of valid financing statements with er-
rors or variations of the debtor's name. By stating that the an error in
the debtor's name renders a financing statement seriously misleading
unless a search under the "correct name" could find it, the drafts were
seemingly easing the burden on searchers to try different possible iter-
ations of the debtor's name. By allowing a debtor's nickname to be
sufficient on a financing statement, the court in Erwin is essentially
requiring searchers to search under names other than the debtor's full
legal name, at least in the case of individual debtors. Where the
debtor has an extremely common last name (e.g., Smith) and lives in a
populous jurisdiction (e.g., California), a search under the debtor's
last name (or the debtor's last name plus first initial) might produce
hundreds of financing statements to sort through. In addition, the
debtor may have more than one nickname that he/she commonly uses.
By permitting deviations from the debtor's legal name, the court ar-
guably augmented the burden on searchers beyond that anticipated by
the revisers of Article 9.
IV. PROCEEDS AND PRIORITIES ISSUES
Revised Article 9 has left in place, albeit renumbered, many of the
priorities and proceeds provisions that existed under former Article 9.
One sees in the new law the familiar priorities rules: the first-in-time
priority rule between two or more secured parties,21 4 the purchase
money superpriority rules for inventory215  and other goods
financers, 21 6 the priority of lien creditor over unperfected security in-
terests,217 the superpriority afforded chattel paper purchasers, 21 8 the
special status given buyers in the ordinary course of business,219 and
so forth. Similarly, the proceeds sections remain largely the same,
permitting secured parties a carryover interest in all identifiable pro-
214. Id. at *2.
215. See U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (2001) (providing that "[clonflicting perfected security interests
* . .rank according to priority in time of filing or perfection.").
216. See id. § 9-324(b) (allowing purchase money secured parties to have priority over earlier
inventory secured parties if they comply with certain perfection and notification requirements).
217. See id. (a) (giving perfected purchase money secured parties with security interests in
non-inventory, non-livestock goods priority over earlier secured parties if they perfect before the
debtor has possession of the goods or within twenty days thereafter).
218. Id. § 9-317(a)(2).
219. U.C.C. § 9-330(a), (b) (2001).
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ceeds of the original collateral 220 plus continued perfection if certain
requirements are met.22 1
The new law has tweaked some of these provisions to clarify
them,222 bring them into harmony with state non-uniform amend-
ments to the old statute,223 or provide greater flexibility to the par-
ties,22 4 but the gist of the provisions remain generally the same. In the
case of proceeds, the revisers expanded the old definition of pro-
ceeds2 25 and changed it to make some proceeds both proceeds and
collateral.226 In addition, Revised Article 9 for the first time expressly
allows secured parties to identify their proceeds from a mass of com-
mingled property (such as a bank account) through traditional equita-
ble tracing fictions. 227
A. Proceeds
Two cases decided under new Article 9 consider, respectively, what
constitutes proceeds and what tracing fiction should be used in the
case of a commingled account. In In re Stallings, the debtors filed for
chapter 12 bankruptcy relief in the spring of 2002 and sought to have a
plan confirmed. 228 The creditor who held a security interest in the
debtors' crops sought to enforce it against post petition payments
from the federal government to compensate the debtors for crop dam-
age that occurred because of the government's use of herbicides in the
area.229 The creditor argued that the payments constituted "pro-
220. See id. § 9-320(a) (permitting ordinary course buyers to take free of even perfected se-
curity interests).
221. See id. § 9-315(a)(2) (stating that "a security interest attaches to any identifiable pro-
ceeds of collateral.").
222. See id. (c), (d) (providing that perfection in proceeds continues for twenty days after the
security interest attaches to the proceeds and beyond in certain circumstances).
223. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-330(a), (b), (f) (2001) (indicating that a notation that chattel paper
has been assigned to an identified assignee will deprive the chattel purchaser of superpriority).
224. See, e.g., id. § 9-324(a) (expanding the filing period for purchase money non-inventory,
non-livestock financers from ten to twenty days, the period most states had adopted before the
Article 9 revision).
225. See id. § 9-317(a)(2)(B) (permitting secured parties to trump lien creditors if they have
filed a financing statement and satisfied one of the steps in attachment).
226. See id. § 9-102(a)(64) & cmt. 13 (noting the expanded definition of proceeds).
227. See id. § 9-102(a)(12)(A) (defining collateral to include "proceeds to which a security
interest attaches"). For example, if the debtor sold encumbered inventory for cash and then
used the cash to buy a piece of equipment, the cash would be both proceeds (since it was re-
ceived upon the sale of the collateral) and collateral (since it would be "proceeds to which [the]
security interest attaches").
228. See U.C.C. § 9-315(b)(2) & cmt. 3 (2001) (recognizing equitable tracing fictions such as
the lowest intermediate balance rule).
229. 290 B.R. 777, 779-80 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003).
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ceeds" of the creditor's collateral, the crops, and thus were subject to
the creditor's security interest. 230
Although sympathetic to the creditor's position, the court felt con-
strained by binding precedent in the Ninth Circuit 231 to hold that
these postpetition payments were not proceeds under federal 232 or
state law. The court recognized that Revised Article 9 had expanded
the definition of proceeds, but even so, "it is too much of an interpre-
tive stretch to view the [government] payment, which can be seen as a
'gift' from the government to [the] effected [sic] farmers, as falling
within the UCC definition of proceeds. '233
The court in Stallings alluded to the pre-revision split of authority as
to whether government agricultural payments of this type are "pro-
ceeds" within the meaning of Article 9, but suggested that the revision
of Article 9's definition of proceeds did not change that ongoing de-
bate. 234 In fact, arguably the new law's expanded definition is suffi-
cient to embrace the government payments, using one of two
approaches. Revised Article 9 includes as proceeds "whatever is col-
lected on, or distributed on account of, collateral" and "rights arising
out of collateral. ' 235 The government payments to the debtors for
damage to their crops could be viewed as money "distributed on ac-
count of collateral," or as "rights arising out of collateral," i.e., the
crops.236 In other words, the debtors would not have been eligible for
these payments had they not been growing or attempting to grow
sugar beets.
Separately, the creditor could have tried to argue that the govern-
ment payments were proceeds of the debtors' general intangibles,
which were also subject to the security agreement. 237 The damage to
230. Id. at 782-83.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 781 (citing Sliney v. Battley (In re Schmitz), 270 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2001)).
233. Under the federal Bankruptcy Code, property acquired post petition is generally not
subject to prepetition security agreements. 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2003). An exception applies to
"proceeds, product, offspring or profits" of property subject to a prepetition security interest.
Id. (b).
234. Stallings, 290 B.R. at 783, n.6.
235. See id. (citing Boyd J. Peterson, Annotation, Secured Transactions: Government Agricul-
tural Program Payments as "Proceeds" of Agricultural Products Under UCC § 9-306, 79 A.L.R.
4th 903 (1990)).
236. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64)(B), (C).
237. In the Official Comment to this section, the drafters specifically note that this section
"rejects the holding of FDIC v. Hastie, 2 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1993) (postpetition cash dividends
on stock subject to a prepetition pledge are not 'proceeds' under Bankruptcy Code Section 552
(b)), to the extent the holding relies on the Article 9 definition of 'proceeds'.). Id. cmt. 13a. One
could analogize post petition government payments to post petition cash dividends-both are
paid "on account of" the underlying collateral.
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the debtors' crops occurred before the bankruptcy petition was
filed.238 Arguably, the debtors' rights to any subsequent government
reimbursement plan accrued at the moment of damage. When the re-
imbursement plan was later enacted and monies paid out, those mon-
ies represented proceeds of a general intangible, namely the debtors'
prepetition right to be compensated for damage to their crops.
Perhaps the bankruptcy court believed, as a policy matter, that al-
lowing the secured party an interest in the government payments
would hinder the debtors' efforts to get their farming business back on
its feet through the chapter 12 process. 239 However, if the debtors had
actually grown the sugar beets that were destroyed by the government
herbicide and then sold them postpetitition, there is no question that
the secured party would have been entitled to press its secured claim
against the monies generated from the sale. Given that the govern-
ment payments in essence represented a substitute for the crops in-
jured or destroyed prepetition, they should have been considered
proceeds as well under federal and state law.
Another federal case involving proceeds applied the newly vali-
dated equitable tracing rules240 in the context of a borrower seeking
return of certain cash collateral held by the bankrupt lender. In Watts
v. Stephenson (In re MJK Clearing, Inc.), the borrower (FBW) had
pledged cash to the lender (MJK) in exchange for the loan of two
million shares of a particular common stock.241 Eventually, the lender
became the subject of a liquidation proceeding under the Securities
Investor Protection Act (SIPA), and a trustee was appointed.242 FBW
tendered the borrowed stock to the trustee and unsuccessfully sought
return of its cash collateral. 243 FBW then filed suit for a declaration
that FBW's cash collateral was not property of MJK's estate.244
In denying the plaintiff's motion for declaratory judgment, the
court, in an unusual application of Article 9 proceeds analysis, held
that the plaintiff could not identify its cash collateral in the hands of
238. See Stallings, 290 B.R. at 782 (noting that the creditor's prepetititon security agreement
covered the debtors' general intangibles).
239. See id. at 780 (stating that crop damage occurred in 2000 and 2001 whereas the bank-
ruptcy petition was filed in the spring of 2002).
240. But see Stallings, 290 B.R. at 789-90 (observing that Congress clearly intended to protect
certain secured creditors in the chapter 12 process).
241. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see generally William Stoddard, Tracing Principles in
Revised Article 9 § 9-315(b) (2): A Matter of Careless Drafting, or an Invitation to Creative Lawy-
ering?, 3 NEv. L.J. 135 (2002).
242. In re MJK Clearing, Inc., 286 B.R. 109, 117-18 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2002).
243. Id. at 129 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2002)). SIPA incorporates certain provisions of the
federal Bankruptcy Code, including subchapters I and II of chapter 7. Id.
244. Id. at 118.
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the creditor, even using equitable tracing principles. 245 In the typical
secured transactions dispute, the creditor will be attempting to extend
its security interest to proceeds of original collateral. 246 If the pro-
ceeds happen to consist of cash that was commingled with other mon-
ies, the creditor will often try to identify its proceeds using tracing
fictions. 247 In this case, the debtor was seeking return of its pledged
cash that had been mixed with other funds.
The court alluded to the plaintiff's reliance on Revised Article 9's
recognition of standard tracing rules in commingled proceeds cases,
and then went on to apply the lowest intermediate balance principle
to the funds at issue.248 Under that principle, "[o]nce the traced pro-
ceeds are withdrawn, however, they are treated as lost, even though
subsequent deposits are made into the account. '249 The court found
that the account to which the plaintiff's cash had been transferred sub-
sequently "dipped to a negative balance," thus making plaintiff's
funds untraceable.250
Although the court's holding is undoubtedly consistent with general
theories applicable to constructive trusts, Revised Article 9's rules on
tracing proceeds do not literally apply to this situation. Here, the
debtor sought to recover its original collateral (i.e., the pledged cash)
as opposed to a secured party attempting to identify the proceeds of
its collateral in the debtor's hands. One of the Official Comments to
another section of Revised Article 9, however, suggests that the
court's use of tracing fictions was appropriate. Revised U.C.C. § 9-
207 specifically allows secured parties in possession of fungible collat-
eral to commingle it251 and permits them to repledge collateral. 252 In
an example involving a repledge of investment property in the Official
Comments, the drafters note that upon satisfying the secured obliga-
tion, the original debtor would have a right to redeem the collateral
from the original secured party.253 But, the Comment states, "in the
absence of a traceable interest, [the original debtor] would retain only
245. Id. at 120.
246. Id. at 122-23.
247. See, e.g., ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Tech Power, Inc., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 344, 345 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the secured party was attempting to assert its security interest in
inventory proceeds deposited in a commingled bank account).
248. See id. at 348 (applying lowest intermediate balance tracing rule).
249. In re MJK Clearing, 286 B.R. at 122-23.
250. Id. at 122.
251. Id.




a personal claim against [the original secured party]" if the latter
failed to return the investment property to the debtor. 254
The lesson of MJK Clearing and Revised U.C.C. § 9-207 seems to
be that debtors who pledge fungible collateral, such as cash or securi-
ties, should consider whether to put a clause in the security agreement
forbidding the secured party to repledge the collateral255 and requir-
ing the secured party to segregate the debtor's property from other
similar property in the secured party's possession. If the debtor's
property is segregated, it presumably remains traceable and thus iden-
tifiable. In the event of financial difficulties or bankruptcy on the se-
cured party's part, the debtor has increased its chances that it will be
able to redeem its collateral from the secured party and not merely be
left with an unsecured claim against the creditor.
B. Priorities
As mentioned earlier, Revised Article 9 retained the essence of the
priorities rules of the old law, refining them here and there. The smat-
tering of priorities cases decided under the new statute does not indi-
cate any remarkable change in direction regarding these issues. In
conflicts between secured parties and other claimants, the key, as al-
ways, to the secured party's obtaining priority is prompt and correct
perfection of its security interest.
In Usinor Industeel v. Leeco Steel Products, Leeco Steel Products
("Leeco") furnished steel to Caterpillar, Inc., for production of a num-
ber of lines of Caterpillar products. 256 In connection with one of these
lines, Leeco purchased steel from Usinor Industeel ("Usinor"), a
French corporation, and in turn sold the steel to Caterpillar.257 The
agreement between Leeco and Usinor provided that Usinor remained
"the owner of the goods up to the complete and total payment of all
sums due. '258 In order to purchase the steel from Usinor, Leeco ob-
tained a line of credit from LaSalle Bank ("LaSalle"), giving LaSalle a
security interest in the steel.259
254. Id. cmt. 6.
255. Id. (emphasis added).
256. See id. cmt. 5 (stating that the secured party's ability to repledge the collateral is "subject,
of course, to any agreement by [it] not to give a security interest.").
257. 209 F. Supp. 2d 880, 881-82 (N.D. Ill. 2002). Although it is not entirely clear, the court
apparently applied Revised Article 9 since the seller's replevin action was commenced on Janu-
ary 23, 2002, after the effective date of Revised Article 9 in Illinois.
258. Id. at 882.
259. Id. The agreement between the parties also provided that any dispute arising out of the
agreement and steel shipments would be resolved in the French court system.
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During the course of performance of the agreement, Caterpillar in-
formed Leeco that it was halting production of its line of products
associated with the steel purchased from Usinor.260 At that time,
Leeco had a large amount of steel in its possession, and owed Usinor
nearly one million dollars for steel purchased under the agreement.
Leeco thereafter defaulted on the obligation to Usinor, and Usinor
brought suit to replevy the steel.261 LaSalle Bank intervened, assert-
ing that its perfected security interest in the steel was superior to what
amounted to an unperfected security interest held by Usinor.262
Following an inquiry as to the appropriate choice of law, the court
found that Illinois law applied to the agreement between the par-
ties.263 Leeco and LaSalle argued that Usinor's purported retention
of ownership of the goods in its contract with Leeco only amounted to
the reservation of a security interest.264 Therefore, these parties ar-
gued that Usinor's failure to perfect this security interest rendered
LaSalle as the lone perfected party with regards to the steel.265
The court agreed that Usinor's reservation of title to the goods con-
stituted reservation of a security interest only.266 In addition, the
court stated that when Leeco took possession of the steel from Usi-
nor, title to the steel passed to it, and thus, it had rights in the collat-
eral sufficient for LaSalle's security interest to attach under U.C.C. §9-
203.267 Since Usinor held only an unperfected security interest in the
steel, and title had passed to Leeco, the possessory action of replevin
was unavailable. 268 LaSalle's perfected security interest in the steel,




262. Usinor, 209 F. Supp. 2d 880, 882 (N.D. I11 2002). Usinor asserted that the value of the
steel in Leeco's possession was worth much less than what it owed under the agreement. In
addition, Usinor brought suit under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods ("CISG"), arguing that the convention governed the agreement between
two foreign parties, thus preempting Illinois law. The Court found that the CISG only governed
contracts between two parties (i.e., buyer and seller) and that the CISG does not address agree-
ments under which a third party has a security interest in the subject goods of the agreement. Id.
at 885.
263. Id. at 883.
264. Usinor, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 886. The Court found that the situs of the goods at the time of
the debtor's insolvency was controlling in determining the choice of law.
265. Id. at 883.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 887.
268. Id. at 888.
269. Id. The court observed that neither the result of the dispute, nor the issue of whether the
CISG controlled the dispute would have come out differently under former U.C.C. Article 9.
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Another seller fared better in a different case when it exercised its
Article 2 right to withhold and stop delivery of goods to a buyer under
certain circumstances. In In re Keistrom Industries, Inc., the seller
had agreed to sell some aerospace components and parts to the debt-
ors.270 Earlier the debtors had given a security interest in all of their
assets to the secured party.271 Eventually, the debtors filed for chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy protection, and the seller sought to withhold deliv-
ery of all goods in its possession.272 The secured party argued that its
perfected security interest in the goods was superior to the seller's
right to withhold delivery.273
The court first decided that the seller was entitled to withhold deliv-
ery of the goods still in its possession under U.C.C. § 2-702 (1).274 Re-
garding the secured party's claim of a superior interest in the goods,
the court noted that one of the Official Comments to Revised Article
9 explicitly stated that a secured party's security interest can be no
greater than the debtor's rights in the collateral. 275 Here, the collat-
eral was subject to the seller's right to withhold delivery, and thus, the
secured party's security interest was subject to it as well. 276 If the se-
cured party wished to obtain the withheld goods, it could have made a
cash payment to the seller, just as the debtor could have. 277
The critical difference between the seller in Usinor and one in Kell-
strom is that the former relinquished possession of the goods to the
debtor whereas the latter did not. Sellers who retain physical posses-
sion of the goods still have the right to withhold delivery in the event
of the buyer's insolvency. Once the buyer gains possession of the
goods, the seller will be left with simply a security interest in them,
and to fully protect that interest, the seller should file a financing
statement under Article 9.
Revised Article 9 expanded the grace period during which purchase
money security parties may perfect their interests and still retain pri-
ority from ten to twenty days.278 Even with this additional time, how-
ever, one secured party ran afoul of the debtor's bankruptcy trustee
270. Usinor, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 889. Although the court does not cite a relevant Code priority
rule, it is clear that its conclusion is correct. See U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(2) (2001).
271. 282 B.R. 787, 789 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 791.
275. Id. at 790. Under U.C.C. § 2-702(1), "[wlhere the seller discovers the buyer to be insol-
vent he may refuse delivery except for cash."
276. Kellstrorn, 282 B.R. at 792 (citing U.C.C. §§ 9-110, cmt. 5 & 2-403(1)).
277. Id. (citing 1A PETER F. COOGAN, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE, § 7D.03[6][b], 7D-15 (2002)).
278. Id.
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by failing to perfect its security interest within the allotted period. In
Forker v. American Honda Finance Corp. (In re Custer), the debtor
had purchased an automobile from a South Dakota dealer and had
taken possession of the vehicle on April 26, 2002.279 The dealer had
the South Dakota certificate of title issued its name.280 The dealer
then mailed the title with the appropriate assignment to the debtor,
who lived in Iowa, so that the debtor could obtain an Iowa certificate
of title. 28 1 The debtor had obtained financing from the lender in con-
nection with the automobile purchase, and on May 31, 2002, the
lender's security interest was noted on the new Iowa certificate of
title .282
Unfortunately for the secured party, the debtor had filed a chapter
7 bankruptcy petition on May 9, 2002.283 Revised Article 9 allows
holders of purchase money security interests to gain priority over a so-
called "gap" lien creditor if they perfect their security interests within
twenty days "after the debtor receives delivery of the collateral. '284
In this case, the trustee in bankruptcy, using its avoiding power under
the "strong arm" clause, would qualify as a "gap" lien creditor-its
interest arose between the time the lender security interest attached
and the time of perfection.285 The bankruptcy court found that the
secured party had not perfected its purchase money security interest
within the twenty-day grace period allotted under state law. 286 The
debtor took delivery of the automobile on April 26, and perfection did
not occur until May 31.287 Thus, the trustee was entitled to avoid the
security interest as unperfected.
Although the chances of actual deception of third parties in this
case were relatively small,2 88 the court applied the twenty-day rule
strictly. To avoid this result, the secured party should have directed
the South Dakota dealer to have the South Dakota title issued in the
debtor's name with the secured party's security interest noted. Then,
under Revised Article 9, when the vehicle was moved to Iowa, the
279. U.C.C. § 9-317(e) & cmt. 8 (2001).
280. Bankr. No. 02-01575S, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 272, at *1-2 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Apr. 4, 2003).
281. Id. at *2.
282. Id. at *2-3.
283. Id. at *3.
284. Id.
285. U.C.C. § 9-317(e) (2001).
286. The trustee acquired hypothetical lien creditor status on May 9, the date the bankruptcy
petition was filed. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2003). The lender's security interest attached as early as
April 25, the date the purchase took place, and it was perfected on May 31. Custer, 2003 Bankr.
LEXIS at *1-3.
287. Id. at *8-9.
288. Id. at *2-3.
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South Dakota certificate would continue to perfect the security inter-
est until such time as the debtor received an Iowa certificate of title
with the security interest noted.28 9 The secured party would have
been able to maintain continuous perfection of its security interest in
this way and avoid nullification of its security interest in bankruptcy.
Under both old and new Article 9, buyers in the ordinary course of
business ("BIOCOBs") are one of the few types of claimants that
trump even a senior perfected secured party.290 In a recent case, how-
ever, an Indiana appellate court found that a buyer did not qualify for
BIOCOB protection because that protection only allows a buyer to
take free of a security interest created by the buyer's own seller, and
none other. In Leasing One Corp. v. Caterpillar Financial Serv. Corp.,
Caterpillar took and perfected a security interest in a backhoe loader
being sold on an installment basis to Boston Equipment Corporation
("Boston"). 291 Without Caterpillar's knowledge, Boston apparently
sold the backhoe to R & D Homes & Supply, Inc. ("R & D"). 292 R &
D received financing for this purchase through Meridian Leasing &
Consultants, Inc., which assigned its interest to Leasing One.293
Boston eventually defaulted on its obligation to Caterpillar, and
Caterpillar sought to repossess the backhoe. 294 Upon discovering the
sale to R & D, Caterpillar asked R & D to surrender the backhoe, and
R & D refused. 295 Caterpillar then brought a replevin action against
R & D and its financer, Leasing One.296 The trial court awarded par-
tial summary judgment in favor of Caterpillar, awarding the backhoe
to Caterpillar, and Leasing One appealed. 297
289. Any third party dealing with the debtor regarding the automobile would have asked to
see the certificate of title. At best, the debtor would have been able to produce a South Dakota
title with an assignment from the dealer to the debtor, but also presumably with some indication
of the lender's security interest.
290. See U.C.C. § 9-316(d) (providing that "a security interest in goods covered by a certifi-
cate of title which is perfected by any method under the law of another jurisdiction when the
goods become covered by a certificate of title from this State remains perfected until the security
interest would have become unperfected under the law of the other jurisdiction had the goods
not become so covered."); Daneman v. Americredit (In re Goncalvez), 291 B.R. 441 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 2003) (applying U.C.C. § 9-316(d) (2001)).
291. U.C.C. § 9-320(a) (2001) & former U.C.C. § 9-307(a) (1995).
292. 776 N.E.2d 408, 409 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). It is not clear whether Boston was actually
purchasing the backhoe or was merely leasing it. But, as the court pointed out, whether the
underlying transaction was a true lease or a disguised secured transaction, did not matter to the
case's outcome. Id. at 413.
293. Id. at 409.
294. Id. at 409-10.
295. Id. at 410.
296. Id.
297. Leasing One, 776 N.E. 2d at 410.
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In a confusing opinion, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that R &
D was not entitled the protection afforded BIOCOBs because the BI-
OCOB rule only allows buyers in ordinary course to take free of se-
curity interests created by their sellers.298 The court stated that
"[b]ecause Leasing One, as assignee of R & D's commercial lease,
purchased the backhoe from Boston, it does not take free of Caterpil-
lar's security interest. '299 In fact, Boston, as the buyer's seller, was the
party who created the security interest in favor of Caterpillar.300 The
BIOCOB rule, therefore, did apply to this situation.
A different but unaddressed question was whether R & D qualified
as a buyer in the ordinary course of business. To be a BIOCOB, a
buyer must buy goods from "a person . . . in the business of selling
goods of that kind. ' 30 1 The seller in this case is identified only as Bos-
ton Equipment Corporation.30 2 It is not entirely clear whether Boston
was an equipment dealer or an entity that used backhoes in its busi-
ness. One might assume that Boston was in fact an equipment dealer,
given that Caterpillar manufactures equipment. 30 3 If so, then R & D
(and its successor-in-interest, Leasing One) would have been entitled
to take free of Caterpillar's security interest under the BIOCOB rule.
V. DEFAULT AND FORECLOSURE ISSUES
The default provisions of former Article 9 were among the statute's
most litigated 3 4-partly because the drafters left certain issues
open 305 and partly because some of the enforcement standards re-
volved around notions of "reasonableness, '30 6 a heavily fact-bound
298. Id.
299. Id. at 412.
300. Id.
301. See U.C.C. § 9-320(a) (2001) (providing that a BIOCOB "takes free of a security interest
created by the buyer's seller, even if the security interest is perfected and the buyer knows of its
existence").
302. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (2002).
303. Leasing One, 776 N.E.2d at 409.
304. The plaintiff Caterpillar in this case was the financial services arm of Caterpillar Equip-
ment Corp., which manufactures over 300 different types of equipment. See http://www.cat.com/
products (last visited July 9, 2003).
305. See Robert M. Lloyd, The Absolute Bar Rule in UCC Foreclosure Sales: A Prescription
for Waste, 40 UCLA L. REV. 695, 699 n.22 (1993) (noting that "[sluits in which the secured party
seeks a deficiency judgment, and the debtor uses the secured party's failure to follow the proce-
dures as a defense, are the most common type of lawsuits under the UCC."); Donald J. Rapson,
Deficient Treatment of Deficiency Claims: Gilmore Would Have Repented, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 491,
508 (1997) (observing that "[d]isputes about the commercial reasonableness of the procedures
followed by the secured party have turned out to be one of the most litigated issues under the
[UCC].").
306. For example, Article 9 was silent as to the consequences of creditor misbehavior during
the foreclosure process, and three distinct lines of judicial authority developed over the years:
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question. Revised Article 9 has clarified the secured party's obliga-
tions upon default by specifying who must receive foreclosure no-
tices, 30 7 by creating a safe-harbor period for giving notice,30 8 by
detailing what is necessary and sufficient in foreclosure sale notices
through expanded rules and sample forms, 30 9 and by adopting the "re-
buttable presumption" approach for misbehaving creditors' punish-
ment in non-consumer transactions.310 Unfortunately, the new law
does not add much to our understanding of what is a "commercially
reasonable" foreclosure sale,311 and as it turns, some of the early cases
decided under Revised Article 9 involve that issue.
A. Post-Repossession: The Debtor's Rights in the Collateral
Since Revised Article 9's suggested effective date of July 1, 2001,
there have been a number of bankruptcy cases deciding whether or
not collateral that had been repossessed after the debtor's default, but
not disposed of, became property of the debtor's estate in a subse-
quent bankruptcy filing. Although Revised Article 9 itself does not
directly address this issue, several courts have inferred from certain
language in the new law that it supports the notion of the debtor's
continued ownership of the collateral until completion of the foreclo-
sure sale.
In In re Robinson, for example, the secured party seized the collat-
eral, a 1996 Cadillac automobile, after the debtor's payment delin-
quency.312 After notice of the foreclosure sale but before the actual
sale, the debtor filed a voluntary chapter 13 petition.313 The secured
party refused to comply with the debtor's request to return the vehi-
cle.314 The debtor then moved to require the secured party to turno-
the absolute bar rule, the set-off approach, and the rebuttable presumption approach. WHrIE &
SUMMERS, supra note 104, at 933.
307. See former U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1995) (requiring "reasonable" notification of the impend-
ing foreclosure sale and a "commercially reasonable" disposition of the collateral).
308. See U.C.C. § 9-611(c) (2001) (specifying that secondary obligors, among others, must re-
ceive foreclosure sale notices).
309. See id. § 9-612(b) (stating that ten days' notice in a non-consumer-transaction is
reasonable).
310. See id. §§ 9-613 & 9-614 (specifying the content of notification).
311. See id. § 9-626(a)(4) (stating that "the amount of proceeds that would have been realized
[in a complying disposition] is equal to the sum of the secured obligation, expenses, and attor-
ney's fees unless the secured party proves that the amount is less than that sum.").
312. See Jean Wegman Burns, New Article 9 of the UCC: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 29, 45 (asserting that Revised Article 9's attempt at fleshing out the "com-
mercially reasonable" standard consists mostly of "tautological restatements of the phrase 'com-
mercially reasonable.'").
313. 285 B.R. 732, 733 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2002).
314. Id.
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ver the vehicle and sought damages against the creditor for willful
violation of the automatic stay.315
Building upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc.,316 the bankruptcy court held that
the debtor did have sufficient rights in the collateral post-default,
post-repossession for the collateral to constitute property of the
debtor's bankruptcy estate.317 The court noted that the Uniform
Commercial Code has deemphasized the location of "title" to prop-
erty as determinative of the parties' rights and remedies with respect
to that property.318 Thus, according to the court, it is not helpful to
determine who had "title" to the vehicle at the time of the bankruptcy
filing. But the debtor, whether or not she had title to the vehicle, still
had a number of specific rights with respect to the vehicle-namely,
the right to notice of the foreclosure sale, the right to surplus proceeds
from the sale, and the right to redeem the collateral. 319 Applying the
rationale of Whiting Pools, the court held that these rights were suffi-
cient to make the collateral property of the debtor's bankruptcy
estate. 32
0
In reaching its conclusion, the court observed that new Article 9
specifically states that the debtor's rights in the collateral are trans-
ferred to a purchaser only upon completion of the foreclosure sale.
321
Even though those rights may not amount to full "ownership" of the
property, the debtor at a minimum has the state law right to redeem
the collateral upon tendering fulfillment of all obligations to the se-
cured party.322 That state law right is expanded by the federal bank-
ruptcy law provisions that allow the debtor to modify the rights of
secured creditors and to cure the default without acceleration of the
entire debt. 323
Using somewhat different reasoning, the bankruptcy court in Tide-
water Finance Co. v. Moffett (In re Moffett) 324 reached the same con-
clusion regarding a repossessed but unsold vehicle that the debtor was
purchasing on an installment plan from the original secured party.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 733-34.
317. 462 U.S. 198 (1983). The Supreme Court in Whiting Pools held that a secured creditor
(in that case, the Internal Revenue Service enforcing a tax lien) was required to turn over prop-
erty seized from a reorganizing debtor pre-petition. Id. at 209.
318. In re Robinson, 285 B.R. 732, 737-38.
319. Id. at 737 (citing Oklahoma's version of U.C.C. § 9-202).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 737-38.
322. See id. at 737 (citing Oklahoma Comments to UCC § 9-610).
323. Id. at 738.
324. See Robinson, 285 B.R. at 738 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), (3)).
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Marlene Moffett bought a car from Hendrick Honda under an install-
ment contract. The contract provided that the secured party had the
right to peacefully repossess the vehicle. 325 Hendrick assigned the
contract to Tidewater Motor Credit.326 After complying with the
terms of the contract for over a year, the debtor missed consecutive
payments in the spring of 2002. On the same day that Tidewater re-
possessed the vehicle as a result of the missed payments, the debtor
filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition.327 The debtor's attorney de-
manded that Tidewater return the vehicle. Although Tidewater had
not yet disposed of the vehicle, it nonetheless refused to return the
car.
328
Tidewater argued that the debtor's default and Tidewater's repos-
session of the car extinguished the debtor's rights to the collateral. 329
According to the creditor, Virginia's version of U.C.C. § 9-619 oper-
ated to divest a debtor of legal title to collateral upon repossession.330
In addition, even if the collateral were property of the debtor's estate,
Tidewater was not in violation of the automatic stay, it asserted, be-
cause "a creditor is not required to return the property until the credi-
tor has been provided adequate protection for its security interest."'331
In addressing whether the debtor's rights to the vehicle were extin-
guished upon Tidewater's repossession, the court held that Tidewa-
ter's repossession "merely divest[ed] the debtor of the present right to
use the vehicle, but did not immediately extinguish the debtor's ti-
tle."'332 The court stated that the whole process of foreclosure divests
the debtor of legal title.333 Since the secured party here did not dis-
pose of the collateral, nor take the necessary steps of notice, reposses-
sion alone did not divest the debtor of legal title.
Similar to the creditor's argument in In re Robinson, Tidewater also
argued that the debtor's proposed redemption of the collateral under
its chapter 13 plan was not allowed under state law. 334 As in Robin-
son, the debtor proposed to go forward with payments to the secured
creditor for the delinquent amount as well as the outstanding amount
325. 288 B.R. 721 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Jul. 8, 2002).
326. Id. at 723.
327. Id. at 274.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 724 (stating that Tidewater filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay).
330. In re Moffett, 288 B.R. at 726.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 274 (citing In re Young, 193 B.R. 620 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1996); In re Massey, 210 B.R.
693 (Bankr. D. Md. 1997)).
333. Id. at 729.
334. Id.
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of the loan.335 And as in Robinson, this court stated that the federal
Bankruptcy Code allowed the chapter 13 debtors to modify the rights
of secured creditors and to cure a default. 336 Because the debtor's
plan sufficiently compensated the creditor for the vehicle's ongoing
depreciation, the debtor was allowed to exercise its right of redemp-
tion in chapter 13.3 37
Although employing slightly different approaches, Robinson and
Moffett are consistent with the post-enactment cases that have consid-
ered this issue.338 Revised Article 9 itself does not directly address the
question of whether the debtor or the secured party "owns" the collat-
eral once the creditor has repossessed it. Instead, the new law makes
clear that the debtor has certain "rights" with respect to the collateral
after default and repossession, 339 such as the right of redemption, 340
the right to any surplus received at a foreclosure sale,341 and the right
to a commercially reasonable disposition of the collateral if a foreclo-
sure sale is held.342 Buried in an Official Comment to a seemingly
unrelated Article 9 provision, the revisers suggest, however, that the
debtor does indeed continue to "own" the goods even after reposses-
sion.343 At a minimum, the Robinson and Moffett decisions seem con-
sistent with the mindset of the Article 9 drafters. Those cases suggest
335. Id. at 731.
336. Id. (noting that the debtor's plan "preserves Tidewater's lien, provides for direct payment
of the regular installments coming due, and cures the delinquent installment payments within a
reasonable period of time.").
337. Id. (stating that "[tlhe fundamental flaw in Tidewater's argument is that it assumes a
debtor's rights in bankruptcy-and in particular, the method by which a debtor may exercise a
right of redemption in chapter 13 - are limited to those allowed under state law.... [T]he right
in chapter 13 to cure a default and to reinstate an accelerated note is granted by federal bank-
ruptcy law, and that right cannot be frustrated by the law of any state" (citing Anderson v.
Associates Commercial Corp., 29 B.R. 563, 595 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983)).
338. In re Moffett, 288 B.R. at 731.
339. See Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Rozier, 290 B.R. 910, 913 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2003) (hold-
ing that title remained with the debtor after repossession of the collateral); In re Sanders, 291
B.R. 97, 102 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003) (holding that the repossessed vehicle itself, not just the
debtor's right of redemption, was property of the debtor's estate); Atlantic Orient Corp. v. AOC
Energy, LLC (In re Atlantic Orient Corp.), 290 B.R. 456, 465-66 (Bankr. D.NH 2003) (holding
that title did not pass from the debtor to the foreclosure sale purchaser until delivery of the
balance of the purchase price).
340. See U.C.C. § 9-617(a)(1) (2001) (stating that a foreclosure sale "transfers to a transferee
for value all of the debtor's rights in the collateral"); § 9-619(a)(3) (allowing the secured party to
create a "transfer statement" that indicates that "a transferee has acquired the rights of the
debtor in the collateral").
341. Id. § 9-623.
342. Id. § 9-615(d)(1).
343. Id. § 9-610(b). In addition to providing the debtor with these rights, Article 9 does not
permit the parties to waive a number of them, even by express agreement. See id. § 9-602 (disal-
lowing waivers of the right to a surplus and the right of redemption, among others).
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that creditors repossessing collateral from defaulting debtors who may
be on the verge of bankruptcy move as quickly as possible to dispose
of the collateral at a foreclosure sale. By selling the collateral, the
secured party will transfer all of the debtor's rights to the purchaser
and will presumably be able to retain the sale proceeds, minus the
debtor's surplus.
B. Strict Foreclosure
Former Article 9 allowed the secured party to retain the repos-
sessed collateral in full satisfaction of the debtor's obligation, a rem-
edy known as "strict foreclosure. '344 In recognition of the benefits
that strict foreclosure can offer both parties, 345 Revised Article 9 ex-
pands the remedy by permitting partial strict foreclosures 346 and re-
moving the requirement that the secured party have possession of the
collateral, thus opening up strict foreclosure to intangible forms of
collateral.347
Strict foreclosures require the debtor's consent.348 For a partial
strict foreclosure, the debtor must expressly consent by authenticating
a record to that effect, post-default. 349 In a full strict foreclosure, in
addition to obtaining the debtor's express consent, the secured party
can create a kind of implied consent by sending the debtor a notifica-
tion of the creditor's proposal to retain the collateral in full satisfac-
tion of the obligation. 350 If the debtor does not object within twenty
days, the debtor's consent is in effect presumed, and the full strict
foreclosure accomplished. 351
344. See U.C.C. § 9-330, cmt. 10(a)(2). This comment gives a rather complex example involv-
ing an inventory secured party (SP-1), a chattel paper purchaser (SP-2), and two debtors (the
original debtor and its customer). When the customer purchases goods from the original debtor
(Dealer), SP-1's security interest in Dealer's inventory will be cut off under the rule protecting
buyers in the ordinary course of business (BIOCOB). If the BIOCOB then defaults on its in-
stallment contract with the Dealer and the Dealer repossesses the goods, the comment states
that "[t]he goods continue to be owned by the BIOCOB." Id. As such, SP-1's security interest
in Dealer's inventory does not reattach because Dealer does not have sufficient rights in the
collateral.
345. Former U.C.C. § 9-505 (1995).
346. See Rapson, supra note 4, at 923 (commenting that strict foreclosure "provides a method
of enforcement that is nonadversarial, requires lower transaction costs, and is not likely to result
in litigation.").
347. See U.C.C. § 9-620(a) (2001) (stating that "a secured party may accept collateral in full or
partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures.").
348. See id. cmt. 7 (stating that the new law "clarifies that intangible collateral, which cannot
be possessed, may be subject to strict foreclosure.").
349. See id. (a) (providing that strict foreclosure occurs "only if (1) the debtor consents to the
acceptance under subsection (c)").
350. Id. (c)(1).
351. U.C.C. § 9-620(c)(2)(A), (B) (2001).
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In In re Cadiz Properties, Inc.,3 5 2 the strict foreclosure issue affected
who was entitled to file for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on the
debtor's behalf. Alford Refrigerated Ware-houses, Inc. ("Alford")
was the sole shareholder of Cadiz Properties ("Cadiz"). 353 In 1997,
Alford entered into a loan agreement with Canfina, AG ("Canfina"),
pledging as collateral for the loan of $2,600,000 its shares of stock in
Cadiz.354 As part of the agreement, Alford deposited the stock certifi-
cates with an escrow agent.355 Alford agreed that upon default, the
escrow agent had the authority to release the stock to Canfina.356 The
parties did not contest "that possession of the stock by the escrow
agent perfected [Canfina's] security interest. '357
In 2001, Canfina, through a number of letters sent to Alford, pur-
portedly notified the debtor of default, and demanded that the escrow
agent release the Cadiz stock.358 Although the escrow agent never
released the stock, Canfina, purportedly acting as Cadiz's sole share-
holder, dismissed the incumbent board of directors and elected new
directors.359 Three weeks later, pursuant to a resolution passed by the
old board, Cadiz filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. 360 In re-
sponse, Canfina brought a motion to dismiss Cadiz's bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. Canfina argued that as the sole shareholder of Cadiz stock,
the Cadiz board of directors lacked the authority to initiate the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. 361
The bankruptcy court had to decide whether the chapter 11 pro-
ceeding filed by Cadiz's old board of directors could go forward.362
The court stated that the issue of who was authorized to file bank-
ruptcy turned on whether the creditor Canfina had in fact strictly fore-
closed on the Cadiz stock.363 If it had, under Revised Article 9, all of
the debtor's rights in the collateral would have been transferred to
it.364
352. Id. (C).
353. 278 B.R. 744 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).




358. Cadiz Properties, 278 B.R. at 748.
359. Id. at 745.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 746.
362. Id. Canfina moved to dismiss the bankruptcy petition under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b), arguing
it was a party in interest in that it was now Cadiz's sole shareholder, and that the Board's lack of
corporate authority constituted a cause for dismissal. Cadiz contended that the new directors it
elected did not authorize the filing of the bankruptcy case. Id.
363. Cadiz Properties, 278 B.R. at 747.
364. The court framed the issue as follows:
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Although the court in Cadiz Properties left to the adversary pro-
ceeding the ultimate determination of the stock ownership, it analyzed
the question briefly in considering Canfina's motion to dismiss the
bankruptcy filing. The court had no trouble in concluding that, under
Texas's version of Revised Article 9, Canfina had not complied with
the requirements for strict foreclosure with respect to the Cadiz stock.
In denying Canfina's motion to dismiss, the court stated that its analy-
sis of the strict foreclosure issue "fortifies the court's application of
the presumption that Cadiz had authority to file the bankruptcy
petition."365
The court rejected Canfina's argument that the escrow arrangement
represented a mutually agreed upon disposition method post-default
and held that the specific Article 9 provisions governing strict foreclo-
sures displaced the general provisions regarding commercially reason-
able dispositions of collateral. 366 Reviewing Revised Article 9's strict
foreclosure provisions, the court noted that for a creditor to accept
collateral in satisfaction of a debt, the debtor must consent to the ac-
ceptance. 367 In order to consent,
The debtor must either agree to the terms of acceptance in a record
authenticated "after default" or the secured creditor must send to
the debtor "after default" a proposal describing its intention to ac-
cept collateral in satisfaction of the debt it secures. For the accept-
ance to become effective, the secured creditor must not receive a
notification of objection authenticated by the debtor within twenty
days after the proposal is sent.368
The court found that Canfina had neither obtained Alford's express
consent to the stock transfer nor sent a strict foreclosure proposal to
Alford, "thereby triggering the twenty day objection time. ' 369 There-
fore, Alford was still the owner of the stock and Canfina's motion to
dismiss was denied. 370
If Alford retained an ownership interest in the Cadiz stock, then the Cadiz board had
not been changed by Canfina, but rather had authorized the filing. If, on the other
hand, Cnafina had obtained the stock in satisfaction of the Alford debt, then Canfina
had changed the board and the new board had not authorized the filing.
Id. at 746. The court intended to resolve the stock ownership issue in a subsequent adversary
proceeding, but needed to decide whether to grant Canfina's motion to dismiss the chapter 11
petition in the meantime.
365. U.C.C. § 9-622(a)(2) (2001).
366. Cadiz Properties, 278 B.R. at 749.
367. Id. Additionally, the court could have cited to the provisions in new Article 9 that pro-
hibit waivers of the debtor protection provisions in U.C.C. §§ 9-620, 9-621, and 9-622. U.C.C.
§ 9-602(10) (2001).
368. Cadiz Properties, 278 B.R. at 748.
369. Id. at 748-49 (citing Texas's version of U.C.C. § 9.620(c)).
370. Id. at 749.
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The holding in Cadiz Properties sends a clear message to secured
creditors that pre-default escrow arrangements will not relieve them
of their Article 9 duties post-default. 371 Revised Article 9's strict fore-
closure provisions, like the notice requirement for foreclosure sales,
protect the debtor's equity of redemption372 as well as its right to re-
ceive a surplus.373 By having its consent solicited or receiving a notifi-
cation of strict foreclosure, the debtor has the opportunity to redeem
the collateral or to force a foreclosure sale at which a surplus might be
generated.
C. Foreclosure by Sale: Notice and Commercial Reasonableness
Like old Article 9, the new statute requires secured creditors to give
reasonable notification of a foreclosure sale and to conduct the dispo-
sition in a commercially reasonable manner. In contrast to the former
law, Revised Article 9 creates a safe-harbor window of ten days for
giving notice in non-consumer transactions. Thus, a creditor giving at
least ten days' notice of the impending disposition is deemed to have
given reasonable notification.
What constitutes a commercially reasonable disposition remains,
however, somewhat murky under the new law as it was under the
old.374 The new Code regurgitates language from former Article 9,
stating that a disposition is "commercially reasonable" if it is made "in
the usual manner in any recognized market," 375 or "at a price current
in any recognized market, ' 376 or "otherwise in conformity with rea-
sonable commercial practices among dealers" in that type of prop-
erty.3 77 As one might expect, the cases decided under Revised Article
9 continue to wrestle with this issue in the context of specific
dispositions.
371. Id.
372. Under U.C.C. § 9-620(c) (2001), the debtor's express or implied consent to the strict
foreclosure must be obtained "after default." The Official Comments to this section also note
that secured parties, in pursuing the strict foreclosure remedy, are subject to the general good
faith requirement imposed on all parties under U.C.C. § 1-203. Id. cmt. 11. In other words, the
creditor could not in good faith attempt to retain collateral in full satisfaction of the debt if the
creditor knew the collateral's value was many times greater than the debt. Id.
373. See id. § 9-623(c) (allowing the debtor to redeem the collateral until the creditor has
accepted it in full or partial satisfaction of the debt).
374. See id. § 9-615(d)(1) (requiring the secured party to pay any surplus from the foreclosure
sale to the debtor).
375. For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see generally Michael Korybu, Searching for
Commercial Reasonableness under the Revised Article 9, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1383 (2002).




Although the notice provisions have been significantly clarified, at
least one secured party still managed not to give the proper notifica-
tion of disposition in a consumer-goods transaction. In In re Down-
ing, the debtor purchased a BMW automobile on an installment plan
and gave the secured creditor a security interest in the vehicle. 378
Subsequently, the debtor filed a chapter 13 petition in bankruptcy,
and under his proposed plan, he agreed to surrender the vehicle to the
creditor. 379 After surrender, the creditor sent the debtor notice of its
intention to sell the vehicle no sooner than ten days after the notice
date. 380 The creditor then sold the car at a commercial auction and
sought a hefty deficiency against the debtor.381 In response, the
debtor argued that he had not received proper notice of the
disposition. 382
In assessing the sufficiency of the creditor's notice, the bankruptcy
court carefully analyzed the newly added Article 9 provisions concern-
ing the content of foreclosure sale notices. The court observed that
under U.C.C. § 9-614, notice in a consumer-goods transaction is re-
quired to contain all of the information listed in § 9-613383 as well as
the additional material specified in § 9-614 itself.384 After examining
the creditor's notice letter to the debtor, the court readily concluded
that certain key pieces of information were missing: (1) the type of
sale contemplated-i.e., public or private; (2) the debtor's responsibil-
ity for a deficiency; (3) the debtor's right to an accounting of his in-
debtedness; and (4) the amount of the claimed indebtedness. 385 Given
the mandatory content of the notice, the court found that the notice
was insufficient.386
Given that insufficiency, the court then had to decide the conse-
quences to the creditor. Revised Article 9 expressly adopts the so-
378. Id. (b)(3).
379. 286 B.R. 900, 902 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2002).
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. The creditor claimed a deficiency of $18, 517.24. Id.
383. Id.
384. U.C.C. § 9-613 states that a notice is sufficient if it describes the debtor, the secured
party, and the collateral; states the method of disposition and the debtor's entitlement to an
accounting; and states "the time and place of a public disposition or the time after which any
other disposition is to be made." U.C.C. § 9-613(1)(A) - (E) (2001).
385. Under U.C.C. § 9-614, in consumer-goods transactions, the creditor must give a notice of
disposition containing all of the information in § 9-613 plus the following additional information:
A description of any deficiency liability; a telephone number from which the debtor can obtain
the amount necessary to redeem the collateral; and a telephone number or mailing address from
which the debtor can obtain additional information about the disposition and the secured obliga-
tion. Id. § 9-614 (1)(A) - (D).
386. Downing, 286 B.R. at 904.
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called "rebuttable presumption" approach as the penalty for creditor
non-compliance with the foreclosure requirements.387 The new stat-
ute, however, leaves open the penalties for creditor misbehavior in
consumer transactions and further states that courts "may not infer
from [the limitation of the rebuttable presumption approach to non-
consumer transactions] the nature of the proper rule in consumer
transactions and may continue to apply established approaches. '3s8
Employing the "absolute bar" approach developed in earlier caselaw,
the court in Downing ultimately held that compliance with the notice
provisions "is a prerequisite to the recovery of a deficiency following
the sale of repossessed collateral. ' 389 Because the creditor did not
comply with the notice requirements, it could not recover any defi-
ciency against the debtor.390
Although only one case, Downing suggests that courts may be in-
clined to enforce the notification requirements strictly, especially in
consumer transactions. New Article 9 even provides model notifica-
tion forms,391 and it certainly behooves any creditor to employ them
and to fill them out accurately. The court in Downing apparently
latched on to the statutory directive to continue to use established
common law approaches in deciding penalties for creditor misbehav-
ior in consumer transactions. Unquestionably, the revisers could have
ensured a greater level of uniformity by prescribing rules for con-
sumer, as well as commercial, transactions, but it is well known that
the various factions within the drafting circle could not agree on the
proper approach for a number of consumer-related issues.392
As mentioned earlier, the secured party's disposition of collateral
must be done in a "commercially reasonable" manner. 393 Courts de-
ciding cases under former Article 9, which contained the same re-
387. Id.
388. Under the rebuttable presumption approach, the amount of the debt owed at default is
presumed to equal the value of the collateral, thus wiping out any deficiency. The secured party
may then attempt to rebut that presumption by proving the extent to which the value of the
collateral is less than the amount owed at default. U.C.C. § 9-626(a)(3), (4) (2001).
389. Id. (b).
390. Downing, 286 B.R. at 902.
391. Id. at 905.
392. U.C.C. §§ 9-613, 9-614 (2001).
393. See Marion W. Benfield, Jr., Consumer Provisions in Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1255, 1255-59 (1999) (describing the deep differences of opinion between consumer and
creditor representatives); Jean Braucher, Deadlock: Consumer Transactions under Revised Arti-
cle 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 83, 83 (1999) (stating that "consumer advocates and consumer creditor
representatives who participated as observers in the drafting process could not reach agreement
on any significant changes"); Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was
the Revision of UCC Article 9?: Reflections of the Reporters, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1357, 1400
(1999) (noting that "[p]articularly lamentable .. .is the treatment-or lack thereof-of certain
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quirement, 394 tended to look at a combination of the price received
and the procedures employed to determine whether a particular fore-
closure sale was commercially reasonable. 395 Some courts emphasized
one element more than another in their analysis.396 Two cases decided
under Revised Article 9 continue the "price/procedures" approach in
resolving whether a particular disposition was commercially
reasonable.
In Vornado PS, L.L.C. v. Primestone Investment Partners, L.P., the
debtor defaulted on its obligations to the secured creditor. 397 The
lender sought to dispose of the collateral, units in a limited partner-
ship ("Units"), at an open outcry auction. The only bidder at the auc-
tion, the lender ended up purchasing the Units.398 The creditor then
sought a declaratory judgment that the foreclosure sale was conducted
in a commercially reasonable manner and moved for summary judg-
ment on that question.399
The Delaware chancery court acknowledged that summary judg-
ment will generally not be appropriate for determinations of commer-
cial reasonableness. 400 The parties will often dispute the precise facts
surrounding the disposition. But the court stated that New York law
allowed courts to grant summary judgment "when they found there
was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the commercial rea-
sonableness of a foreclosure sale. '401
During the course of its opinion, the court meticulously recounted
the entire foreclosure sale process, including several auctions that had
to be canceled at the last minute. 40 2 The court noted that the creditor
had employed an experienced firm to market the Units, had adver-
tised the foreclosure sale in major daily newspapers, and had hired a
licensed auctioneer to conduct the sale.40 3 Responding to the debtor's
objection that the creditor used a public, rather than a private, sale,
aspects of consumer transactions" and that the rules in § 9-626 regarding creditor penalties re-
sulted from a "compromise" and "a damage-control effort.").
394. U.C.C. § 9-610(b) (2001).
395. See Former U.C.C. § 9-504 (3) (1995) (stating that every aspect of the disposition ...
must be commercially reasonable).
396. Wombles Charters, Inc. v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 6186 (JSM), 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10566, at *11-*17 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1999); Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 370
N.E.2d 918, 923 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977).
397. See, e.g., Walker v. McTague, 737 N.E.2d 404, 410 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that the
"primary factor to be considered is the price received by the secured party").
398. 821 A.2d 296, 300 (Del. Ch. 2002), affd, 822 A.2d 397 (Del. 2003).
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 315.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 306-310.
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the court stated that under the Code rules the secured party was al-
lowed to bid on the collateral only at a public sale and that the credi-
tor "was one of the most interested and able purchasers of the
Units. "404
The court in Vornado also spent considerable time reviewing the
debtor's objection that the price received for the Units was "unrea-
sonably low." Subject to certain conditions, the Units were exchange-
able on a one-to-one basis with shares of PGE, a publicly traded
company. The court noted that "[a]t the auction, the Units sold at a
price equivalent to the closing price of PGE shares on the New York
Stock Exchange on the date of the foreclosure sale." Given the con-
ceded economic equivalency between the Units and the PGE shares,
the court implied that the auction price was fair.40 5 Based on the thor-
oughness of the procedures employed and the fair price attained at
the auction, the court granted the creditor's motion for summary judg-
ment and held that the creditor "was entitled to a declaration that the
foreclosure sale was conducted in a commercially reasonable
manner. ",406
The court in a recent Oregon appellate case utilized a similar ap-
proach to determine whether a lessor's disposition of leased goods
was commercially reasonable. Although true leases are not subject to
Article 9, the court in Allco Enterprises, Inc. v. Goldstein Family Liv-
ing Trust applied Article 9's commercially reasonable standard to a
lessor's sale of leased property because the lease agreement specified
that in the event of the lessee's default and the lessor's repossession of
the goods, the lessor was to dispose of the goods in a commercially
reasonable manner.40 7 Noting Oregon's extremely deferential stan-
dard for appellate review, 40 8 the appellate court quickly upheld the
trial court's judgment that the disposition was commercially
reasonable.40 9
As in Vornado, the court reviewed both the price received at the
disposition and the procedures employed. The court stated that there
404. Vornado, 821 A.2d at 314-316.
405. Id.
406. See id. at 315 (citing the section in U.C.C. § 9-627(b) that states that a disposition is
commercially reasonable if it is made "at the price current in any recognized market at the time
of disposition."). The court also observed in a footnote that the creditor is not obligated to
receive actual market value for collateral in a foreclosure sale and that New York caselaw has
upheld bids as low as thirty percent of fair market value. Id. at n.43.
407. Id. at 316.
408. 51 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
409. Oregon appellate courts are not permitted to overturn a trial court decision unless they
"can affirmatively say that 'no evidence' supports it." Id.
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was "no direct evidence that the equipment was sold for less than its
value in any recognized market. ' 410 Additionally, the court noted the
evidence that at least twenty-five bidders attended the auction, one of
the lessees attended the auction and even helped to select the auction-
eer, and that claimed "paperwork irregularities" either were not mate-
rial or were not adequately documented by the lessees. 411
Given Revised Article 9's adherence to the commercially reasona-
ble standard for foreclosure sales, it is not surprising that recent cases
have continued to examine in some detail the particular facts and cir-
cumstances of the challenged dispositions. In light of the enormous
variation in the types of collateral involved-everything from cars to
stocks to antiques-it may not have been possible for the revisers to
have fleshed out the standard any more than they have. In the revi-
sion, the drafters, however, did clarify certain burden of proof issues.
The new law states that the secured party does not need to prove that
it complied with the enforcement provisions "unless the debtor or a
secondary obligor places the secured party's compliance in issue. '412
Once compliance issues are raised, the secured creditor has the ulti-
mate burden to prove its compliance. 413
VI. CONCLUSION
This survey of cases decided under Revised Article 9 does not re-
flect a major "sea of change" in the law. The courts are seemingly
surviving what could have been a bumpy ride through the transition
period, which ends July 1, 2006, in most jurisdictions. Many of the
same issues that existed under the old law have reemerged, such as the
eternal question of what constitutes a commercially reasonable dispo-
sition of the collateral. But, at the same time, one can observe the
effects of the revisers' attempts to clarify and simplify aspects of the
former Article 9. The clarity provided by the foreclosure notice forms
in new Article 9 has guided one court to the easy conclusion that the
secured party's notification was inadequate. The new law's express
approval of the equitable tracing fictions allowed another court to em-
ploy the lowest intermediate balance rule without hesitation. The
410. Id. at 1279.
411. Id.
412. Id. In dealing with the auctioneer's advertising costs, the trial court had deducted half of
the claimed expenses in calculating the damages "because of its own apparent concerns about
the strength of plaintiff's proof." Id. In other words, the appellate court thought that the trial
court had adequately considered the questionable nature of some of the advertising expenses.
413. U.C.C. § 9-626 (a)(1) (2001).
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stripped down requirements for financing statements have permitted
judges to validate filings with minimal information.
The revision process for Article 9 took nearly a decade and con-
sumed the talents and energies of some of the most prominent com-
mercial law scholars and practitioners. Even before most states
adopted Revised Article 9, critics were quick to point out its cumber-
some length,414 its sometimes impenetrable language,41 s5 and its failure
to address important consumer issues. 416 In the end, the passage of
time and additional judicial input may determine whether the Report-
ers for the new law were completely successful in achieving their
goals.
414. Id. (a)(2).
415. See John L. McCabe & Arthur H. Travers, Introducing Revised Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 30 COLO. LAW 9 (2001) (noting that the "Revision is substantially bulkier
than its predecessor," resulting in some loss of "elegance.").
416. See Burns, supra note 311, at 61 (commenting that "[i]n a number of places in new Arti-
cle 9, the drafters used a language that looks like English but is totally incomprehensible.").
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